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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-Trust Laws-Price Discrimination Act-Requisite
Competitive Injury and Burden of Proof
Immediately following the passage of the Robinson-Patman Amend-
ment to §2 of the Clayton Act,1 considerable discussion took place
concerning its probable effect on the marketing structure of the nation,2
together with some speculation as to how its controversial provisions
would be treated by the Federal Trade Commission and in the courts.3
Now in its twelfth year, the Act is seen to be "in a very important
period of judicial review and construction,"'4 as important questions
of interpretation and administration are being decided in increasing
numbers by the Supreme Court.3 Some of these were considered re-
cently in Federal Trade Comnmission v. Morton Salt Co.6
There, a cease and desist order had been issued against Morton Salt
as a result of a finding by the Commission that the respondent's use
of a "standard quantity discount system" in the sale of its products
amounted to a price discrimination within the meaning of §2(a).7 On
review, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the Commis-
sion's findings and order, and directed a dismissal of the complaint s
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1946).
'E.g., BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN LAW (Werne ed. 1938); ZORN
& FEiLDMAN, BUsINESs UNDER THE NEW PicE LAws (1937); Burns, Anti-Trust
Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAW & CONTEmP. PROD. 301, 308-
19 (1937); George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First Year, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 392 (1937); Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman
Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 137 (1937);
McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW &
CoNTEmP. PROB. 334 (1937); Smith, The Patman Act in Practice, 35 MxcHi. L,
R.xv. 705 (1937); The Robinson-Patman Act in Action, 46 YALE L. J. 447 (1937);
Note, Marketing Under the Robinson- Patman Act, 31 ILL. L. REv. 907 (1937).
'E.g., PATMAN, THE RoBINSON-PATIAN Acr (1938); Copeland, The Prob-
len of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 HARV. Bus. Rv. 156 (1937);
McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 273, 289-96 (1937) ; McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-
Patman Act: Possibilities of Construction, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 410 (1937);
Stevens, W. H. S., An Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 2 J. MARKET-
ING 38 (1937).
' Haslett, Price Discriminations ad Their Justifications Under the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936, 46 MIcn-. L. REv. 450, 451 (1948).
'E.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948);
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948) ; Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743 (1947); Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726 (1945); Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945).
668 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948).
'Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), order modified, 40 F.T.C. 388 (1945).8 Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F. 2d 949 (C.CA. 7th
1947), 60 HARV. L. Rav. 1167 (1948), 42 ILL. L. REv. 556 (1948), 15 U. or CR.
L. Rav. 384 (1948).
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The majority of the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Black, held, inter alia, that 1.) the announced quantity dis-
counts were discriminatory, 2.) the burden of justifying the discrimina-
tion rested with the company, and 3.) there had been a sufficient show-
ing by the Commission that the discrimination had the required effect
on competition. Accordingly, the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was reversed.9
On the question of discrimination, it should be noted first that Mor-
ton's price system, given by the Supreme Court as
Per case
Less-than-carload purchases ................. $1.60
Carload purchases ......................... 1.50
5,000-case purchases in ny consecutive
12 months ............................. 1.40
50,000-case purchases in any consecutive
12 months ............................ 1.35,
involved both of the two general types of quantity discounts, viz., the
non-cumulative or unit delivery discount which is based on the size of
the individual order (here represented by the ten cent discount for car-
load purchases), and the cumulative or volume discount based on the
aggregate volume of orders filled within a specified period of time re-
gardless of the size or number of orders within that period. 0
Prior to this time reasonable non-cumulative discounts had not gen-
erally been regarded with disfavor by those charged with the enforce-
ment of the Act, whereas cumulative discounts were consistently deemed
discriminatory, 11 except those so arranged that even the smaller buyers
could avail themselves of all the quantity limits.1 2 The reason for this
lies in the fact that the unit delivery discounts have an obvious com-
mercial utility, savings in selling and delivery cost,13 while cumulative
'68 Sup. Ct. 822 (1948). Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, dissented in part. Other questions, not treated in this note, were considered,
e.g., smallness of the item, id. at 829 and 835 (dissenting opinion) on which see,
H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666, 680 (1938) ; Bayly, Four Years Under the Robin-
son-Patman Act, 25 MINN. L. REv. 131, 145 (1941); Haslett, supra note 4, at
468-9.
"0 Ostlund, The Robinson-Patman Act and Quantity Discounts, 14 ACCOUNTING
REv. 402, 403 (1939) ; Stevens, Some Laws of Quantity Discounts, 2 J. Bus. 406
(1929).
" Haslett, supra note 4, at 463-4 and Commission cases cited. Maclntyre,
Section 2(a): Its Application to the Quantity Price, SymosIuM ON RoBIxsoN-
PATMAN ACT, Naw YORIC STATE BAR Ass'N (CCH) 10, at 16 (1948) (herein-
after cited as SYmpOSIUm). By reasonable non-cumulative discounts is meant
those not clearly disproportionate to delivery costs.
22 E.g., Kraft-Phoenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937) ; American Optical
Co., 28 F.T.C. 169 (1939). See Bayly, supra note 9, at 146. Crowley, Equal Price
Treatment Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 306, 328 (1947).
"' Stevens, W. H. S., Some Laws on Quantity Discounts, 3 J. Bus. 51, 55-6
(1930) ; 31 ILL. L. Rlv. 907, 921 (1937).
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discounts are commercially advantageous primarily with respect to
manufacturing costs only, and even there the saving may be more in
theory than in fact, especially in the sale of stock merchandise.
14
In holding the system to be discriminatory the majority of the Court
made no distinction between these types, but looked to the fact that the
discount brackets were so broad only five large retail chain grocers had
ever quialified for the cheapest rate offered, while some of their small
independent competitors were unable to qualify even for the carload
price. Thus, though ostensibly the discounts were available to all on
equal terms, "functionally" they were not, the actual result being a
rather large differential in price among competitors. Accordingly, since
"the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abun-
dantly clear that Congress considered it an evil that a large buyer could
secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the
large buyer's quantity purchasing ability"' 5 such a differential (in-
volving competitive injury) is a discrimination under the Act.
Unquestionably, the objective of some of the proponents of the Act
was to eliminate as far as possible the competitive advantage of large
chain stores as indicated by the Court. It is not quite as certain, how-
ever, that either the intent of Congress or the words of the Act went
the full distance toward that objective. 18 Indeed, the Robinson-Patman
Act purports to take its place with that segment of the broad field of
anti-trust law which is concerned with promoting fair competition. This
seems to indicate that its purpose was to remove the competitive advan-
14 Sawyer, The Commission's Administration of Paragraph 2(a) f the Robin-
son-Patman Act: An Appraisal, 8 GEo. W.sH. L. Ray. 469, 476-8, 488-90 (1940);
H. C. Brill Co. 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938), discussed in Bayly, supra note 9, at 163-4.
Copeland, supra note 3, at 163-4; Ostlund, supra note 10, at 403 ("Actually it
has appeared at times that costs of supplying purchasers of large volume may
exceed as a percentage of sales the cost of supplying certain smaller purchasers.").
Stevens, W. H. S., An Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 2 J. MARKET-
ING 38, 42 (1937) ; Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
65 J. AccouNTANcy 480, 484 (1938); Thorp, Price Discrimination and Cost, 63
J. AccouNTANCy 183, 184 (1937).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 826 (1948).
See Learned & Isaacs, supra note 2, at 142 (behind the Act is a general assumption
against bigness) and George, Federal Trade Commission Decision in the Goodyear
Case III, 44 DuN's REvIEw 5, 9-10 (June 1936) (briefly summarizing both sides
of "big v. little" argument).
"8 Learned & Issacs, supra note 2, at 149 ("It was the apparent intention of
Congress, however, to preserve for these institutions [the large chains] their
operating efficiencies."). That Congress intended a justified price differential to
be lawful even though it operated in favor of a large buyer is obvious from the
fact it made other and specific provision (quantity limits proviso, infra note 19)
for such a contingency. Patman, op. cit. supra note 3, at 260- ("It is entirely
possible that quantity discounts of such proportions may be legally granted as to
enable large dealers to drive out smaller ones. This is the very reason that a
protective factor was incorporated [quantity limits proviso]."). See also 80
CoNG. Rac. 8111, 6282 (1936).
[Vol. 27
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tage of large buyers only to the extent that such advantage was unfair.' 7
And "large quantity purchasing ability" is not in itself unfair-it is
merely a power, obtained through the utilization of an efficient method
of sales and distribution, which may be used either fairly, to encourage
competition by effecting savings to the consumer,'8 or unfairly, to sup-
press competition and create monopoly. The Act strikes only at the
latter use of this power, not at the power itself.' 9 This point is recog-
nized by the Court-but it is stressed by the minority in urging that a
distinction should be made "between discounts which the Act would
foster and those it would condemn." 20
The conclusion then that Morton's cumulative discount system is a
discrimination is entirely supportable. Yet this phase of the opinion
appears open to the criticism that the language (quoted at note 15
above) overstates the proposition in such a manner as to open the way
for an application of the Act to situations beyond its scope, which can
work a detriment to those small buyers for whose benefit it was
enacted.
21
"? For an excellent statement of the meaning of competition see Stevens, W. H.
S., An Interpretation of the Robinron-Patinan Act, 2 J. MARKETING 38 (1937).
Bayly, mtpra note 9, at 187 (meaning of unfair).
18 See Stevens, W. H. S., Brief for Respondent, Raymond Bros.-Clark Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 280 F. 529 (C.C.A. 8th 1922) reprinted in OPPEN-
HEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL. ANTI-TRuST LAWS 720, 721 (1948) ("Each of these
systems of distribution [the old line 'wholesaler-retailer-consumer' and the chain-
store 'retailer-consumer'] thus in conflict is entitled economically under the rule
of fair competition to compete with the other on the basis of the prices of the
goods, their quality, and such incidental service as may be rendered, and each
system is entitled economically to survive to the extent to which it serves the
public in these respects. The one system might conceivably eliminate the other,
but if this elimination be due to lower prices, better quality, superior service ..
the elimination in question is but a part of the competitive process.").
10 As pointed out mpra note 16, where the Commission finds, after due investi-
gation and hearing, that there are so few purchasers able to qualify for large quan-
tity discounts in a certain commodity that the situation is promotive of monopoly,
it may establish quantity limits under the second proviso of §2(a). Thus "the
Act puts a limitation on producing and selling efficiency at a point where it seems
likely to injure competition. . . . The economic and competitive theory lying
behind this provision is much the same as that which has been consistently applied
by the Interstate Commerce Commission in rejecting applications for lower rates
on train load than on carload lots." Stevens, An Interpretation of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 2 J. MARKcETING 38, 45 (1937).
The first use to be made of the Commission's power under this proviso was
begun by a resolution to investigate the tire industry, adopted July 7, 1947. CCH
TRADE REG. SEnv. ff24,015 (FTC 1948).
"o Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 834 (1948).
Stevens, supra note 19, at 45 ("The danger to fair competition comes not pri-
marily from the customary and relatively small ... differentials given by nearly
all sellers and taken advantage of by hundreds and thousands of distributors, but
rather from the large differentials ... available only to a limited number of
large mass buyers. With its power to prescribe quantity limits [the Commission's]
real opportunity lies in the elimination of the unreasonably large and discrimina-
tory differentials, which are and alwayg have been a real menace to fair compe-
tition.").
21 Learned & Isaacs, supra note 2, at 150, 154-5; George, Business Adjusts It-
self to the Robinson-Patnman Act, 45 DuN's REVIEW 11, 12 (March 1937) ; Ost-
lund, mpra note 10, at 403; 31 ILL. L. REV. 907, 939 (1937).
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Even where a price schedule contains wide differentials, it may
nevertheless be lawful if justifiable under the cost difference or other
proviso of the Act,22 which brings us to the second phase of the case.
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals had been understood as
requiring that in order to establish a violation the Commission must
show not only a price differential between competing buyers but also
the absence of any justification, on the theory that there is no discrimi-
nation so long as the differential may be justified.23 It is not clear
whether the Supreme Court so understood the opinion, but its position
on this much discussed point was placed beyond question by the state-
ment-"We think that ... Congress meant... that in a case involving
competitive injury between a seller's customers, the Commission need
only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for
like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser's com-
petitors."
2 4
This seems to settle the law as to who has the burden of proof, but
the question of how the burden shall be met was not presented.' We
get a clue, however, that it must be by explicit showing, from the
Court's attitude toward carload discounts. It is arguable that the ten
cent per unit discount on carload shipments is so obviously the result
of a saving in transportation costs that judicial notice could be taken
of the fact at least so far as to raise a presumption in favor of the
seller.2 6 But the Court said carload discounts, "like all others, can be
justified by a seller who proves that the full amount of the discount is
based on his actual savings in cost. The trouble with this phase of re-
spondent's case is that it has thus far failed to make such proof." 2'
Perhaps the most significant phase of the case, at least so far as
the practical enforcibility of the Act is concerned, is in regard to the
"2 Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences, in the cost of manufacture, sale, or de-
livery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are to such purchasers sold or delivered."
"Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 827 (1948);
60 HAnv. L. Rav. 1167 (1948) ; 42 IL. L. Rv. 556 (1948) ; 15 U. OF CH. L. R v.
384 (1948).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 827-8 (1948).
The conclusion is based both upon the general rule of statutory construction that
the party seeking to avail himself of an exception to a prohibition has the burden
of bringing himself within it, and upon §2(b) which gives the commission a prima
fade case upon proof of discrimination "unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown." See, 80 CoNG. REc. 3599 (1936).
" Much has been written and said about this eminently practical problem, which
is beyond the scope of this note. For specimens see Freer, Accounting Problems
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 J. ACCOUNTANCy 480 (1938) ; Thorp, Price
Discrimination and Cost, 63 J. ACcOUNTANcY 183 (1937) ; Ostlund, supra note 10;
Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act of 1936, 46 Mica. L. Rav. 450, 472 (1948).
"6 See Haslett, The Validity of Quantity Discounts, SymPosiuM (CCH) 26, 34
(1948) (disapproving).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 822, 829 (1948).
[Vol. 27
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finding of requisite injury to competition. Under the Clayton Act dis-
criminations were unlawful where their effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create monopoly in any line of commerce."
By adding to this the phrase "or to injure, destroy or prevent compe-
tition with any person .. .", Congress intended that the work of the
Commission in curbing injurious practices at their inception should be
facilitated by maldng the law "less rigorous in its provisions as to the
effect required to be shown in order to bring a given discrimination
within its prohibitions." 28 The Circuit Court of Appeals did not hold
simply that the burden of alleging and proving the required competitive
effect was upon the Commission, which the Commission had from the
very beginning assumed to be the case29 and which the present Supreme
Court decision does not disturb. But, in attacking the evidence in this
case as insufficient, it virtually required a showing of actual injury.3 0
-Such a conclusion clearly finds no support either in the language of the
Act or in the cases construing it. The courts have quite generally con-
sidered the phrase "may be substantially to injure, etc.", as used in
these Clayton Act sections, as requiring a finding simply of 'reasonable
probability of injury described.31 In reversing the lower court, how-
ever, the Supreme Court saw the statute as requiring of the Commis-
sion no more than a finding of reasonable possibility of requisite injury,
a conclusion which itself constitutes a substantial departure in the other
direction from the interpretation hitherto considered fairly well es-
tablished.
3 2
"'Remarks of Congressman Utterback, 80 CoNG. EC. 9417 (1936). This is
generally conceded. But see McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 415 (belief that the
Amendment did not substantially extend the area already covered by the Clayton
Act).
"Austern, Required Competitive Injury, SYmposIum (CCH) 63, 68 (1947);
Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Pat-
mals Act of 1936, 46 Micr. L. Rxv. 450, 474 (1948). F. T. C. Brief in Opposition,
p. 8, Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A.
2d 1945) reprinted in Austern, supra, at 73 ("The Commission has always con-
strued the Act to require it as a part of its affirmative case to present evidence
that a discrimination may lessen or tend to injure competition.")..
"8 Or so it seems, if the evidence must reveal that a competitor of a favored
buyer was forced to "re-sell at a substantially reduced profit" before the court
can detect a violation. Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F. 2d
949, 956 (C.C.A. 7th 1947). See 15 U. OF CH . L. REv. 384, 387 (1948) and
Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications Under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act of 1936, 46 Mici. L. REv. 450, 466-7 (1948).
' Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726,
738 (1945) ; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291,
298 (1930) (§7 Clayton Act); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U.S. 346, 356-7 (1922) (§3 Clayton Act). But cf. United States v. Lexing-
ton Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914) (Food & Drug Act).
"' See cases cited note 31 supra. The Court relied solely upon certain language
in the Corn Products case, supra note 31, which was forcefully demonstrated by
Mr. Justice Jackson to be in conflict with other, more carefully considered language
in the same case, and presumably to have been used inadvertently, 68 Sup. Ct. 822,
833-4 (dissenting opinion).
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The advisability of announcing the "possibility of injury" test as a
standard for the future is open to question, not merely because it was
unnecessary in order to sustain the Commission in this case,33 but par-
ticularly as a matter of sound administrative policy. By invoking the
new standard here, considerable doubt is cast upon the prospective
status of other Clayton Act sections which contain substantially the
same language 3 4 More fundamentally, the Federal Trade Commission,
being an expert and specialized agency with broad powers of subpoena
and investigation should be in a position to demonstrate with adequate
evidence that a given discrimination will probably result in the effect
required.3 5 As a matter of fact, the Commission has made at least this
showing in the §2(a) cases which have gone before the courts in recent
years.38 Whether the Commission will now avail itself of this more
liberal standard, or will continue its apparent policy, is a question of
great importance to all concerned with the Act, because a practical re-
sult-of the test announced could be to shift a large portion of the bur-
den of proof in this matter to the defendant, who is least able to
meet it. That is, in order to defend on the ground that the required
competitive effect is not inherent in his pricing schedule, the respondent
must rebut the slender showing of possible effect, presumably with
proof that injury cannot or will not result. Moreover, it is but a short
logical step from this to the point of shifting the entire burden by
allowing an inference that injury is possible from the existence of a
price discrimination.3 7 Already this result has been reached in two
instances38 by invoking the prima facie case provision of §2(b), and
" Id. at 828 ("There are specific findings that such [actual] injuries had resulted
from respondent's discounts although the statute does not require the Commission
to find that injury has actually resulted.") ; id. 835 ("It is not merely probable
but I think it is almost inevitable that the cumulative discounts [tend to injure com-
petition]") (dissenting opinion).
", Will the same standard apply to §3 concerning tying clauses and §7 concern-
ing stock acquisitions?
" Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?, Symposxu
(CCH) 141, 152 (1948).
" Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793, 815 (1948);
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 144 F. 2d 211, 215
(C.C.A. 7th 1944) ; A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 144 F.
2d 221, 223-4 (C.C.A. 7th 1944) (reversing its earlier conclusion, 135 F. 2d 453,
455, that injury was not shown) ; E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 142 F. 2d 511, 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1944); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) on which see Austern, supra
note 29, at 70-1.
", Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F. 2d 949, 960 (C.C.A.
7th 1947) ("The fact of the discrimination itself, it seems to me, would have
supported an inference that the effect may be to lessen competition.") (dissenting
opinion of Judge Minton).
"' Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A.
2d 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1944), modified, 155 F. 2d 1016 (1946)
(Commission must show 1. differential in price, 2. competitors who could be in-
jured; then the burden is on respondent to show either no injury to competition




the problem may soon be before the Supreme Court for determination
in the Standard Oil case (now pending review before the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals), wherein the Commission stated: "Based upon
the prima facie case ... shown the Commission may draw from such
prima facie case a rebuttable presumption that the effect of such dis-
crimination may be to .... injure, destroy or prevent competition. The
burden then shifts to the respondent."3 9
Whether or not this view will be urged, and if urged sustained in
the courts, it is quite certain the Morton Salt case is no authority for
the doctrine. That the burden rests with the Commission to make what-
ever showing is required, is implicit throughout the opinion. And be-
fore the Morton case is used to go further in the direction of shifting
the burden to the defendant, it would be well to bear in mind another
consideration forcefully suggested by Albert Sawyer some eight years
ago.
"The broad inference of injury from the fact of discrimination
places before the Commission the strong temptation to depart
from the realities of each individual case and write into these in-
ferences economic doctrine which may or may not have the sanc-
tion of actual experience. The long range usefulness of the Act,
depends to a large measure upon the extent to which the Com-
mission works into the daily consciousness of American business-
men the rightfulness of the nondiscrimination policy. A factual
determination of injury or tendency toward injury clearly pre-
sented in each case will do more than any other one thing to en-
courage business practice consistent with the objective of the
Act."40
The Supreme Court's unequivocal ruling in" this case that neither
actual injury to competition nor absence of cost justification is required
of the Commission as a part of its case, is essential to effective Robin-
son-Patman Act enforcement. Since only limited funds and facilities
are available to the Commission for the execution of its important and
difficult regulative functions, to require more proof in establishing vio-
lations of laws within its jurisdiction than the laws apparently demand,
is seriously to hinder their enforcement. To require less, however, as
does the Supreme Court's possibility of injury standard, is to invite
into the law a practice inconsistent with basic principles underlying
"Id. at (slip report) 14-15. This concerned whether the §2(b) proviso for
meeting an equally low price of a competitor is a substantive or procedural de-
fense, but this tendency to oversimplify the Commission's case comes "perilously
close to converting the Commission's prima facie case into a virtual per se viola-
tion based upon a mere price difference." Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Pat-
man Act Be Amended?, SYmposIum (CCH) 141, 152 (1948). Compare, Mr.
Justice Jackson in International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 Sup. Ct. 12, 15
(1948).
" Sawyer, supra note 14, at 501.
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the rules on burden of proof and procedural due process which obtain
not only in the orthodox courts, but quasi-judicial, administrative pro-
ceedings as well.
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Divorce-Coflateral Attack on-
Divisibility of-
The United States Supreme Court recently decided four cases which
have significant bearing on the degree of credit to which a foreign de-
cree of divorce is entitled. The legal points dealt with in the first two
cases are different from those in the last two; therefore, they will be
treated separately.
COLLATERAL ATTACK By REsPONDENT WHO APPEARED IN
DIVORCE ACTION
Respondent,' Sherrer, had appeared generally in a divorce action,
brought by petitioner in Florida three months after she left respondent
in Massachusetts where they had resided for twelve years. Petitioner
there alleged, and the Florida court found, that she was a bona fide
resident of Florida. Respondent did not challenge either the allegation
or finding. The divorce was granted. Respondent brought this suit
in Massachusetts in which he alleged that the petitioner was his wife
and prayed that he might be allowed to convey his realty as if he were
sole and living apart from her justifiably. The Probate Court granted
the relief prayed for, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed on the ground that petitioner was never domiciled in Florida.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that the require-
ments of full faith and credit bar a defendant from attacking collaterally
a divorce decree on jurisdictional grotinds in the courts of a sister state
where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce
proceedings, and where the defendant has been accorded full oppor-
tunity to contest the jurisdictional issues.2
The Supreme Court had held in Williams v. North Carolinas that
while the finding of domicile by the court that granted the decree is
entitled to prima facie weight, it is not conclusive in the state of matri-
monial domicile but might be relitigated there, in a bigamy prosecution.
In Dazis v. Davis,4 where the defendant had appeared and fully liti-
gated the issue of the plaintiff's domicile, the Court held that the finding
"Petitioner" and "respondent" are used throughout to refer to the petitioner
and respondeht in the divorce proceeding.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087 (1948). The decision in this case ap-
plies also to the companion case of Coe v. Coe, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948), therefore
the cases are treated as one. Accord: In re Biggers, 228 N. C. 743 (1948).
'325 U. S. 226 (1945). See Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce, 24 N. C.
L. REv. 1 (1945).
'305 U. S. 32 (1938).
[Vol. 27
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of domicile in the divorce proceeding was res judicata and binding on
the defendant in all courts.5 In the instant case, the Court held that,
even though the respondent had failed to contest the jurisdiction of the
court in the Florida proceeding, his appearance and participation dis-
tinguished the case froni the situation presented in Williams v. North
Carolina6 and brought it within the rule of the Davis case.7 "If re-
spondent failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded him,
the responsibility is his own. We do not believe that the dereliction of
a defendant under such circumstances should be permitted to provide
a basis for subsequent attack in a sister state on a decree valid in the
state in which it was rendered." s
In Coe v. Coe,9 decided on the same day as the Sherrer case, the
court held that the rule laid down in the latter case "is no less applicable
where... the party initiating the collateral attack is the party in whose
favor the [divorce] decree was entered."' 0
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. Justice Murphy con-
curred, dissented."1 The dissent was based on the contention that the
decision of the majority renders possible consent divorces by sham pro-
ceedings in a foreign state, which would impair the paramount interest
of the home state in the marital relations of its citizens. "That interest
cannot be bartered or bargained away by the immediate parties to the
controversy by a default or an arranged contest in a proceeding for
divorce in a state to which the parties are strangers.' 2
The interest of Massachusetts in the Sherrer case was likened to
that of North Carolina in the Williams case, the only difference being
that Massachusetts asserted its interests through civil litigation between
private parties, whereas North Carolina did it directly by criminal
In this case the court merely applied law to findings of domicile in divorce
proceedings that it had already applied in other fields of the law. Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
8325 U. S. 226 (1945).
"The principle that res judicata may be pleaded as a bar to jurisdictional ques-
tions which might have been litigated in the earlier proceeding was applied in
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939).
For a complete discussion of res judicata as applied to jurisdictional questions, see;
Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 CoL. L. REv. 1015
(1940).
868 Sup. Ct. 1087, 1091 (1948).
'68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948). The respondent filed a cross complaint in the di-
vorce proceeding, and was granted a divorce and alimony by the Nevada Court.
She then brought contempt proceedings against the petitioner in Massachusetts for
violation of a Massachusetts support order which was in effect before the divorce.
2
0 Id. at 1096.
" 68 Sup. Ct. 1097 (1948). The dissent applied to both cases.
"Id. at 1098. The dissenting justices do not consider Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S.
32 (1938) as contrary authority, because, by their interpretation of that case, the
rule there laid down was dictum inasmuch as the Court found that the state grant-
ing the divorce was in fact that of the domicile. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup.
Ct. 1097, 1098 n. 1 (1948).
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prosecution.' 3 The dissent concluded that even if the Florida decision
be accorded "every weight,"'14 the evidence justified the Massachusetts
court in finding no Florida domicile. It criticizes the majority for that
under its decision the home state of the parties is not permitted to ques-
tion the matter regardless of overwhelming evidence that the asserted
domicile is a sham just as long as the parties have gone through the
form of a controversy.
Assimilating the two cases, the principle evolved appears to be this:
where a court of one state has personal jurisdiction over the respondent
in a divorce proceeding, and that respondent has an "opportunity" to
contest the issue of domicile, a decision by the court that the petitioner
is domiciled within the state is res judicata and is binding on both
parties in the state of last marital domicile, both as to marital capacity
and the duty of support.
Several serious questions remain unanswered.15 What effect do
these decisions have on the historic principle that jurisdiction to grant
a divorce is founded on domicile, and a decree granted where there is
no domicile is not entitled to full faith and credit ?1o May this principle
now be nullified by a feigned legal contest in a foreign state, or will the
Court leave open the right, in the home state, to prove fraud,17 i.e.,
that a mock contest was won by prearrangement? 18 If it does so leave
it open, then the decisions render more uncertain a field of law already
thoroughly unsettled.19 If not, then the decisions encourage collusion
and fraud, and make consent divorces available only to those rich
enough to spend six weeks in Nevada. It would also open the door to
an academic argument that divorce proceedings, where both parties
appear, are strictly in personam.
20
Does litigation of the question of jurisdiction by the parties, or the
"opportunity" to do so, foreclose a collateral attack by the state of last
marital domicile? Does it foreclose a collateral- attack by interested
parties not appearing in the suit? Unless we adopt the view of the
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1097, 1100 (1948)." Id. at 1107.
"Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce, 24 N. C. L. REv. 1, 30 (1945).
"°Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901) ; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226 (1945).
1 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1097, 1103 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
" One writer suggests that if the finding of domicile is "reasonable" the de-
cision may not be collaterally attacked, but that an "unreasonable" finding would
be subject to collateral attack, even though there is personal jurisdiction. Holt,
Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock? 39 MicH. L. REv. 689, 715 (1941).
1" In such a case no one would know whether or not the divorce was good or
not until a collateral attack had been made on it, and the issue of fraud or col-
lusion litigated.
" The United States Supreme Court has already discarded the idea that the
proceeding is strictly in rem, but recognize that a divorce decree partakes of
some of the characteristics of a decree in rein. Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U. S. 226 (1945).
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dissent that the state exerts its sovereign power in civil suits between
the parties, these decisions can have no binding effect on the state. But
if the rule of these cases is not applied where the state is attacking the
decree, then the appearance renders the foreign decree valid as regards
civil responsibility but not as to criminal liability.
DuTY OF SUPPORT
In Estin v. Estin2l respondent was awarded a decree of separation
and alimony by a New York court. The petitioner later went to Nevada
and obtained an ex parte divorce which made no provision for alimony.
Therefore, he ceased payment under the New York decree. This was
a suit by the respondent for accrued alimony, in which the petitioner
appeared and moved to eliminate the alimony provisions of that decree.
The New York Supreme Court found that petitioner was a bona fide
resident of Nevada. In spite of this finding the court denied petitioner's
motion and granted respondent a judgment for the arrears which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In affirming, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Nevada had no power to adjudicate the re-
spondent's rights in the New York judgment, and New York need not
give full faith and credit to that phase of the Nevada decree. The
New York judgment is an intangible property interest of respondent,
which grants rights to her and imposes obligations on petitioner. The
state of the domicile of a debtor has no power to determine the personal
rights of the creditor in this interest, unless it has jurisdiction over his
person. Nevada cannot thus exercise an in personam jurisdiction over
a person not before the court.
Petitioner attempted to show that by the law of New York its courts
have no power to compel a man to support his ex-wife, and that a sup-
port order does not survive divorce. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, had no trouble with this contention. "The difficulty with
that argument is that the highest court in New York has held in this
case that a support order can survive divorce .. .. That conclusion is
binding on us .... ,22 Earlier decisions are immaterial so long as New
York today says that is her policy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented.23 He readily agreed with the
proposition that New York might decline to allow any ex parte divorce
to dissolve its prior separate maintenance decree. But he asserted that
New York could not give less effect to a valid Nevada divorce than it
would give a New York divorce similarly obtained. Since it was not
clear whether or not the New York law discriminated against foreign
' Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213 (1948). The companion case of Kreiger v.
Kreiger, 68 Sup. Ct. 1221 (1948) is indistinguishable, therefore the decision ap-
plies to both cases.22Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1216 (1948).
" See, id. at 1219 (dissenting opinion).
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divorces, Mr. Justice Frankfurter would remand the case to the New
York Court of Appeals for clarification on that point.
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissent.2 4 He agreed with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter that the Nevada judgment should have the same
effect as a similar New York judgment. He also objected to the de-
cision on the ground that it made the Nevada decision half good and
half bad, whereas the Constitution commands that it be given full faith
and credit.
The majority opinion 25 frankly recognizes that the result of the
decision is to make divorces divisible,
2 6 putting some of the elements 27
within the control of the state of the husband's domicile and leaving
others in the control of the state of the wife's domicile. "It accommo-
dates the interests of both Nevada and New York in this broken mar-
riage by restricting each state to the matters of her dominant concern."
2 8
The complexity of the American law of divorce may be attributed
to the widely divergent local views with regard to divorce and the fact
that a wife is allowed to maintain a domicile separate from that of her
husband.29 Since we allow separate domiciles, and it would be unde-
sirable to override local policy with respect to divorce, a compromise
seems to be the only solution for the courts.30 This was accomplished
in the instant case by apportioning to the two states jurisdiction over the
legal components of the marital status in which they have a dominant
interest.3'
It was established in Williams v. North Caroliu) 2 in overruling
" Id. at 1220 (dissenting opinion).
25Id. at 1218.
" This principle was suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas in a footnote in Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 n. 4 (1942). In Esenwien v. Pennsylvania
325 U. S. 279 (1945) he was joined by Justices Black and Rutledge in a con-
curring opinion in which he advocated the divisible divorce and declared that
there is a "basic difference between the problem of marital capacity and the prob-
lem of support."
" The decision only divides divorce into two elements, 1. marital capacity, and
2. duty of support. There may be additional elements such as; capacity of the
wife to remarry, property rights of the husband, property rights of the wife, duty
of husband to support the wife, duty of husband to support the children.
" Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. at 1218 (1948).
" Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942).
8 Advocacy of legislative reform is beyond the scope of this note, which is in-
tended to be confined to the technical legal problems involved. So much has al-
ready been written on that subject that further comment would be wasted effort.
Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CoRmN.= L. Q. 393, 405
(1936).
Uniformity in divorce is for Congress, not the courts. See Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, dissenting, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1097, 1101 (1948).
8 The divisible divorce has been advocated by several imminent legal writers.
Among these are: Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overrled?, 18 IND. L. J. 165
(1942); Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 393
(1936) ; Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. Ray. 930 (1945); Barn-
hard, Haddock Reversed-Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce, 31 GEo. L. J. 210
(1943).38 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
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Haddock v. Haddock,3 3 that the state of the husband's domicile has
sufficient interest in his marital status to restore his marital capacity.
The instant -case establishes that the state where the stay-behind spouse
has long been domiciled has an interest in making the husband continue
a prior obligation to support her, which interest is stronger than any to
be accredited to the state of the husband's new domicile.8 4
Only by refusing to recognize that the marital status is made up of
several elements can it be argued that full faith and credit has been
denied the Nevada decree.85 The marital capacity of Mr. Estin was
restored by the Nevada decree not only by Nevada law but under the
law of New York. On the other band, his marital duty to support was
not affected because Nevada had not the legal power to decree dissolu-
tion -in that particular.
The dissenting justices cited no authority8 6 for their proposition
that New York must give the same effect to the Nevada decree as it
would a similar New York decree. Such is not required by the full
faith and credit clause37 and the statute passed pursuant thereto.38  The
requirement is that decrees "shall have such faith and credit . .. as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they
are taken."3 9 That such is the law was dramatically shown by the case
of Roche v. McDonald,40 wherein Washington was required to enforce
an Oregon judgment based on a Washington judgment which, by the
law of Washington, was absolutely void. The proposition of those dis-
senting could only be sustained under some vague notion of due process
or equal protection of the law. But assuming that the charge of dis-
crimination is true, is it not reasonable that New York should provide
that a New York support order does not survive a domestic decree of
divorce, while it does survive a foreign decree ?41 In a domestic divorce
so201 U. S. 562 (1906).
8,Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REy. 930, 954 (1945).
's Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CORN. L. Q. 393, 421
(1936); Barnhard, Haddock Reversed-Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce, 31
Gao. L. J. 210, 222 (1943).
"' Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that New York could not consistently with the
first Williams case discriminate against Nevada decrees. See Estin v. Estin, 68
Sup. Ct. at 1220 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
7 U. S. CoNST. ART. IV §1, provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
state. .. "
"a 1 STAT. 122 (1790), as amended, 2 STAT. 299, 28 U. S. C. §687 (1946).
so Ibid.
,0 275 U. S. 449 (1927).
' The question as to domestic divorce has been answered in the affirmative by
some state courts. See, e.g., Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977
(1910) ("Nor is there any necessary connection between divorce and alimony; a
divorce may be granted without alimony; and alimony may be granted where no
divorce is decreed."). But where the wife has secured a foreign divorce the cases
uniformly deny alimony on the ground that it is an incident of the marriage rela-
tion,; that severance of the relation terminates the right to alimony. See, e.g.
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proceeding, New York would have an opportunity to protect its interest
in the support of its domiciliary, whereas it would have no such oppor-
tunity in a foreign proceeding.
Confined to its facts, the holding of the case is that the state of the
husband's domicile has no power to adjudicate the rights of the absent
wife in a prior support order, issued by the state of last marital domicile
which had jurisdiction over both parties. Thus a serious question is
posed. If there had been no support order, could Mrs. Estin have
maintained a suit for support in New York? Language in the instant
case, 42 and in the concurring opinion in the Esenwein case43 would give
an affirmative answer. But this language was not necessary for the
holding in either case, both of which involved prior support orders. An
affirmative is also indicated by the fact that the Court refused to pass
on the credit due the New York decree by Nevada, but chose to put the
decision on the broader ground that Nevada had no power to adjudicate
rights in the New York decree." But it must be noted that the Court
characterized the New York decree as an intangible property right,
4"
over which jurisdiction can be obtained only by personal jurisdiction
over the owner. Would the mere right of the wife to receive support
in New York be classed as such a property right ?4
If the rule of the instant case applies to the duty of support, even in
the absence of a domestic decree, then the case of Haddock v. Haddock47
was either never overruled or has been revived. On its precise facts,
all that was decided by that case was that the state of the wife's domicile
need not give effect to a foreign divorce decree insofar as that decree
purported to destroy the husband's duty under the domestic law to
furnish economic support to his former wife, as though she were still
his wife.48 The case did not decide that Mr. and Mrs. Haddock were
still husband and wife. Since the Williams case 49 was not concerned
with the duty of support, the statement of Mr. Justice Douglas in that
case that, "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled" may be classified as
McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921) ; Schweinwald v. Schwein-
wald, 231 App. Div. 757, 246 N. Y. Supp. 33 (2d Dep't 1930). If the wife appears
in the foreign proceeding she is bound by that decree both as to marital capacity
and duty of support. Coe v. Coe, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948).
4268 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1218 (1948).
"325 U. S. 279, 282 (1945).
"Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1218 (1948).
Ibid.
" It may be easier for Nevada to refuse to enforce a foreign cause of action
than it would be to refuse to enforce a foreign judgment. Compare Roche v.
McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1927), with Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S.
412 (1918).
'1201 U. S. 562 (1906).
48 Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942) ; Bing-
ham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CoRIu. L. Q. 393 (1936); Powell,
And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARV. L. REv. 930 (1945).
"1 317 U. S. at 304 (1942).
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dictum.50 Due to the logical and verbal difficulty of granting the wife
separation and alimony if the marriage relation still existed, the case
was interpreted by many as holding that the foreign divorce was good
for no purpose.51 But this difficulty is obviated by recognizing the
marital status as being composed of separate elements.
In 1943, Professor Holt made a prediction that seems to have come
true: "Yet the bones of Haddock v. Haddock remain-unbleached and
unpulverized ... courts in states that do not favor free and easy ter-
mination of marriage may still find in the osseous remains of Haddock
v. Haddock material to fashion some puzzles for the Supreme Court of
the United States to solve .... 52
JAY W. ALEXANDER.
Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-State Court to Be Followed in
Diversity Cases under the Erie Rule
Prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' federal courts in diversity
of citizenship cases were bound to follow statutes of a state in deter-
mining the state law under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 2 The Erie
case, interpreting the Rules of Decision Act,3 held that federal courts
must also follow the case law of the state as announced by its highest
court. "The Erie R. Co. case left open, however, the more difficult
question of the effect to be given to decisions by the lower state courts
on points never passed on by the highest state court."' 4 The Supreme
Court of the United States has, since the Erie case, held that a federal
court is not free to disregard the law of the state merely because it has
not been announced by the highest court of the state, but that, in the
absence of more persuasive data of what the state law is, they must
follow the decision of an intermediate state court.5
" Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942) ; Powell,
And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAxv. L. REv. 930 (1945).
"See e.g., BEALE, CONFLICTs OF LAWS §§113.10-113.12.
" Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 MicH. L. REv. 1013, 1036
(1943).
'304 U. S. 64 (1938).
* 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
'Judiciary Act of (Sept. 24) 1789, §34, REv. STAT. §721, 28 U.S.C. §725 (1946).
'King v. Order of United C6mmercial Travelers of America, 68 Sup. Ct. 488,
491 (1948).
'Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Hy. Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940); West v.
American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
311 U. S. 464 (1940). Accordingly, federal courts have followed decisions of
intermediate courts in the following states:
California-Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Hy. Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940).
Delaware-United Automatic Rifles Corp. v. Johnson, 41 F. Supp. 86 (D. Mass.
1941.
Illinois-Pullman Std. Can Mfg. Co. v. Local Union U.S.W., 152 F. 2d 493
(C.C.A. 7th 1945).
Missouri-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
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Should federal courts, in the absence of a decision by the highest
court or an intermediate court of the state, be required to follow a de-
cision of a state court of first instance? When this question was first
brought before the United States Supreme Court in Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field,6 it was held that a federal court in applying the law
of New Jersey must follow the decision of the New Jersey Court of
Chancery. 7 The Court of Chancery, however, was not the usual nisi
prius court in that: it had statewide jurisdiction; its decisions were re-
corded and printed in available form and were ordinarily binding in
later cases in the Chancery; and its standing on the equity side was
comparable to that of the New Jersey intermediate appellate courts of
law. Since that decision, the question has been before a number of the
lower federal courts, the majority of which distinguished the Fidelity
case, and held that they were not bound to follow the state courts of
first instance. The distinction is based mainly on the fact that the
jurisdiction and organization of these state courts are quite different
from the New Jersey Court of Chancery.8
Recently this question was again before the Supreme Court in King
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America.9 The case arose
in a South Carolina District Court,10 which, in the absence of any South
Carolina decision on the question, applied the general principals of
South Carolina law-" and found for the plaintiff. The defendant ap-
New York-Preferred Accm Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F. 2d 165 (C.C.A. 10th
1944).
Ohio-West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940).
Oregon-Mallatt v. Ostrander Ry. & Timber Co., 46 F. Supp. 250 (D. Oregon
1942).
Texas-Wells Fargo Bank & T. Co. v. Titus, 41 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Texas
1941), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F. 2d' 223 (C.C.A. 5th 1943).
8311 U. S. 169 (1940).
The Court of Chancery, as a separate court, was abolished by the New Jersey
Constitution adopted November 4, 1947.
8 Wyatt v. Miami Beach, 67 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Fla. 1946) (refused to follow
the Circuit Court of Dade County, Fla.; distinguished from the Fidelity case
mainly on the jurisdiction and organization of the two courts). In re Berlin, 147
F. 2d 491 (C.C.A. 3rd 1945) (refused to follow a Pennsylvania lower court, say-
ing it was persuasive but not binding). Contra: Buttson v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492
(E.D. Pa. 1945). But cf. Miller v. National City Bank of New York, 69 F. Supp.
187 (S.D. N. Y. 1946), aff'd, 166 F. 2d 723 (C.C.A. 2d 1948) (followed a New
York court of first instance; however, the intermediate appellate court had af-
firmed the lower court without opinion). But see Kane v. Sesac Inc., 54 F. Supp.
853 (S.D. N.Y. 1943) ; Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron Works, 55 F. Supp. 861 (D. Del.
1944). Contra: Schran v. Safely Inv. Co., 39 F. Supp. 517 (E. D. Mich. 1941).
'68 Sup. Ct. 448 (1948).
'o 65 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. S.C. 1946) (Action on life insurance policy con-
taining exemption clause for death resulting from participation in aviation. Fed-
eral jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Insured was forced down at
sea, later seen alive and not seriously injured, but was dead when picked up.
Medical diagnosis of drowning. Question involved was interpretation of exemp-
tion clause).
" Policy construed most strongly against insurer. In accordance with the hold-
ing in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943) that, in the absence of
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pealed. Two months later, in a case involving a similar insurance
policy brought by King against a different insurer, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas for Spartanburg County, South Carolina,' 2 reached the same
conclusion'8 as the District Court in the first King case. However, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on hearing the first King case,1 4 held
that the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was not binding on it
as an expression of the South Carolina law,15 and reversed the District
Court. It made the point that the Common Pleas decision was not
binding on other courts of the state and that the District Court decision
in this case had been partly relied on as a basis in the Common Pleas
decision. In affirming,1 6 the United States Supreme Court noted that
though the South Carolina Courts of Common Pleas are denominated
courts of record, their decisions are not published or digested in any
form and would be very difficult to locate. Further, their decisions
do not evidence one of the rules of decisions commonly accepted and
acted upon by the bar and other inferior courts of South Carolina. This
holding, though the first such limitation to be placed on the "Erie Doc-
trine," does not appear to be out of line with previous holdings of the
Supreme Court. It is a thoroughly logical conclusion, especially when
viewed in the light of Angel v. Bullington, decided only two years pre-
viously, where the Court said "For the purpose of diversity jurisdiction
a federal court is 'in effect, only another court of the state.' "7
The Court in the King case, however, emphasized that ". . . our
decision [is not] to be taken as promulgating a general rule that federal
courts need never abide by the determination of state law by state trial
courts."' 8 It would appear then, that although federal courts may not
some recognized public policy to the contrary which would warrant its non-exer-
cise, where the jurisdiction of the federal courts is properly invoked in diversity
cases, it is the duty of the federal court to render judgment, deciding questions of
state law. Merely because the questions are difficult or unsettled is no reason for
the federal courts to refuse to render judgment.
"A court of original jurisdiction in all civil cases. S. C. CONS?. Art. V, §1.
"' Under S. C. CoDE ANN. §§26, 780 (194:) the insurer had the right to ap-
peal, but did not do so.
"161 F. 2d 108 .(C.C.A. 4th 1946).
"Under the doctrine of Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S.
538 (1941) even though the Common Pleas decision was rendered after the dis-
trict court decision, it was proper for the circuit court of appeals to consider it,
since it is the duty of the federal courts to apply the then controlling decisions.
when the case comes before them.
"aKing v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 68 Sup. Ct. 488
(.1948). Shortly after the circuit court of appeals rendered its decision another
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, the one for Greenville County, handed
down an opinion which rejected the reasoning of the Spartanburg court and
espoused that of the circuit court of appeals. The Supreme Court pointed to this
second decision and said that it was an illustration of the perils of interpreting a
Common Pleas decision as a definite expression of the South Carolina law and
not a controlling factor in their decision.
7326 U. S. 183, 187 (1945).
" 68 Sup. Ct. 488, 493 (1948).
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be bound by the decision of a state court of first instance under certain
circumstances, they cannot completely ignore it. In the absence of any
decision in a state on a point of law in a diversity case, the federal
court, in deciding the state law, would look to other states for law on
the point19 and consult the current textbooks,20 the restatements of the
law,21 the general statements of law by the state supreme court relating
to the subject,22 and the common law of the state.238 In addition, when
a decision by a state court of first instance is found, it would seem that
this also should be duly considered by the federal court, even though
it may have been determined that this decision is not binding on it. A
trial judge of a state court of first instance is experienced and well-
versed in the law of the state, hence a decision rendered by him would
be pertinent and should receive weight in the federal court's determina-
tion of the state law. Especially does this appear relevant when we
consider MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.,24 where the
Supreme Court said that the interpretation placed upon purely local
law by a federal district judge of long experience sitting in Michigan
and three circuit court of appeals judges whose circuit includes Michi-
gan would not be disturbed in the absence of a state decision on the
point.
Comparing the Fidelity case with the King case, several factors are
noted which may be useful in determining whether a decision of a state
court of first instance is binding on a federal court or mere evidence of
the state law which is to be used in the determination of the state law:
(1) are the decisions of the court in question considered as a binding
authority on other state courts; (2) are the decisions of the court in
question recorded, printed, or digested in such a manner that they are
accessible to the bar and other inferior courts; (3) has the court in
question statewide jurisdiction? Of these three the first would appear
to be the most important and unless the decision is binding on other
state courts it is doubtful that it would be binding on a federal court
even if the decision of the court were recorded and the court had state-
wide jurisdiction. However, if the decisions are not printed in such a
manner as to be available, even if the decisions were binding on other
courts of the state, it would be almost impossible to determine if all
the decisions of the courts of first instance on the question had been pre-
sented before the federal court. It would appear, therefore, that for a
decision of a state court of first instance to be binding on a federal
9 Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 122 F. 2d 820 (C.C.A. 3rd 1941).20 Ibid.21 Ibid.
Verslius v. Town of Haskell, Okla., 154 F. 2d 935 (C.C.A. 10th 1946).23New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 118 F. 2d 414 (C.C.A. 4th
1941).
24315 U. S. 280, 281 (1941).
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court, the decision must be binding on other state courts and also must
be printed in available form.
With these factors as a guide a decision of the Superior Court of
North Carolina, for example, apparently would not be binding on a
federal court in the determination of the law of the state in the absence
of a decision on the point by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
but mere evidence of the law of the state. The status of the Superior
Court of North Carolina is very similar to that of the Court of Common
Pleas of South Carolina. It is denominated a court of record, but its
decisions are recorded only in the local courthouse of the county and
are not reprinted or digested in any way which would make them ac-
cessible to the bar or other inferior courts. Further, a decision by one
Superior Court in North Carolina is not binding on another Superior
Court in this state. The court does not have statewide jurisdiction
within the meaning set forth in the United States Supreme Court opin-
ions in that, while it does have jurisdiction over all the citizens of North
Carolina, it has jurisdiction to try only such cases that are triable within
the county in which the court is located.
2 5
A. A. ZOLLICOFFER, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Notice of Injury
Requirements
More than half of the states have statutes of general application
requiring that notice of tort claims against municipalities be given within
certain fixed time limits to designated city officials.' The requirement
is also frequently found in municipal charters, but no notice is necessary
in the absence of legal provision so requiring.
2
North Carolina has a statute3 requiring that a prior demand be made
upon the proper municipal authorities before suing a city, county, town,
or other municipal corporation, but it expressly applies only to debts
or demands arising out of contract where the damages are liquidated.
Another statute4 requires that claims against counties, cities, and towns
" N. C. GEN STAT. §§1-76 to, 1-82 (1943).
'Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L.
Rrv. 700, 701 (1942). For a list of states see Sahm, Tort Notice of Claim to
Municipalities, 46 DIcx. L. REv. 1 n. 2 (1941).
26 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2888 (2d ed. 1937); WHITE, NEG-
LIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §665 (1920).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §153-64 (1943). judicial decisions restricted the operation
of this statute to contract actions long before it was expressly limited in this re-
gard. E.g., Sugg v. Greenville, 169 N. C. 606, 86 S. E. 695 (1915) ; Neal v.
Marion, 126 N. C. 412, 35 S. E. 812 (1900) ; Sheldon v. Asheville, 119 N. C. 606,
25 S. E. 781 (1896); Frisby v. Marshall, 119 N. C. 570, 26 S. E. 251 (1896);
Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896) ; McINTOsH, NORTH CARO-
LrNA PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE §389 (1929).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-53 (1947 Supp.) : "All claims against counties, cities
and towns of this state shall be presented to the chairman of the board of county
19481
146 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
be presented to designated officials within two years after maturity or
be forever barred, but this statute has never been construed as applicable
to tort actions. 5 Both of these statutes will bar an action to which they
are applicable unless the requirements they impose are met.6
Unless authorized by statute or charter, a municipality has no power
to require notice of claims before suits thereon shall be brought against
it,7 and even where a city has home rule powers the decisions have
been against the existence of a power to establish a notice requirement
by local action.8 Several North Carolina cities and towns have notice
of injury provisions in their charters. 9 Some have prior presentment
commissioners, or to the chief officers of the cities and towns, within two years
after the maturity of such claims, or the holders shall be forever barred from a
recovery thereon; provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall
not apply to claims based upon bonds, notes, and interest coupons, except claims
based upon bonds, notes, and interest coupons ... which mature after March first,
one thousand nine hundred forty-five... .
' This latter statute was enacted in 1875, the act being entitled "An Act to As-
certain the Indebtedness of the Different Counties, Cities and Towns of this State,
and to prescribe a Statute of Limitations." N. C. Pub. Laws 1674-5, c. 243. It
became N. C. CODE §756 (1883), and the statute on "prior presentation of debts
and demands" (construed not to apply to tort actions at an early date, see note 3
supra) immediately followed as N. C. CODE §757 (1883), both appearing with
statutes concerning county revenue. Sec. 4 provided that it should not apply to
any county whose debts were already audited and ascertained. The first case
construing this statute set out its object as being "to enable the municipal bodies
mentioned to make a record of their valid outstanding obligations, and to separate
them from the spurious and illegal." Wharton v. Commissioners, 82 N. C. 12
(1880). It seems clear that the statute was passed to meet an emergency in the
financial affairs of municipal bodies brought about by the Civil War. Royster v.
Commissioners, 98 N. C. 148, 153, 3 S. E. 739, 741 (1887) (dissenting opinion).
In the N. C. REvISAL (1905), the statute on "prior demand before suit" remained
in the chapter on county government (present G.S. §153-64). The statute on
"presentation within two years or action will be barred" was moved to the chapter
on statutes of limitation, where it is located today (G.S. §1-53). While the for-
mer was many times construed to apply only to contract actions, the latter was
not construed as to this point. The court has cited G.S. §1-53 when dealing with
nuisance cases, but the bare citation without comment plus the possibility of a
contract theory of the action do not make very strong authority for the proposition
that this statute applies to tort as well as contract actions. Moore v. Charlotte, 204
N. C. 37, 39, 167 S. E. 380, 381 (1933) ; Lightner v. Raleigh, 206 N. C. 496, 503,
174 S. E. 272, 276 (1934) ; Ivester v. Winston-Salem, 215 N. C. 1, 7, 1 S. E. 2d
88, 91 (1939). In Moore v. Charlotte, supra, the tort theory was held barred by
the city charter provision as to notice of injury. This would have been unneces-
sary had the statute under discussion barred the tort action. The origin of G.S.
§1-53, its early association with G.S. §153-64, the fact that both use language more
properly concerned with contract such as "claim," "maturity," and "holders," the
original proviso that it should not apply to any county whose debts were already
audited and ascertained, the original title of the act, its object being described by
the Court in terms of "valid and outstanding obligations" and "valid debts" all
indicate a confinement of this statute to contract claims. Such a construction
would be in accord with the majority view concerning such statutes. 6 McQuiL-
LIN, op. cit. supra note 2, §§2629, 2890. See IV DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TiONS §1613 (5th ed. 1911).
'MACINTosH, op. cit. supra note 3, §§187, 384, and 389.
'6 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 2, §2629.
'Note 170 A. L. R. 237 (1947) ; 20 NAT. MUNIC. REv. 608, 726 (1931).
'E.g., N. C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1939, c. 366, §59 (Charlotte) : "No action for dam-
ages against said city of any character whatever, to either person or property, shall
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of claim provisions which would seem to be merely local versions of
N. C. GEN. STAT. §153-64 (1943), though they are not expressly limited
to contract claims.10 Notice of injury, whether required by statute or
charter, should be sharply distinguished from the prior notice of de-
fects which must be proved in order to sustain municipal liability for
injury resulting from defective condition of streets and sidewalks.-"
Some notice of injury charter provisions are expressly limited to
torts, but the typical provision is not expressly so limited. Yet the
language is such as to logically restrict its operation to the field of tort,
though ihere is some support for a different view.' 2 On the assumption
that the notice provision only applied to tort, the plaintiff in Stephens
Co. v. Charlotte,'3 who had failed to give notice in time, amended his
be instituted against said city, unless within ninety (90) days after the happening or
infliction of the injury complained of, the complainant, his executors or administra-
tors, shall have given notice to the city council of said city of such injury in
writing, stating in such notice the date and place of happening or infliction of
such injury, the manner of such infliction, the character of the injury and the
amount of damages claimed therefor, but this shall not prevent any time of limi-
tation prescribed by law from commencing to run at the date of happening or in-
fliction of such injury or in ahy manner interfere with its running." The follow-
ing charter provisions are substantially the same as that of Charlotte: N. C. Priv.
Laws 1913, c. 59, art. XXII, §2 (Raleigh); N. C. Priv. Laws 1901, c. 100, §103
(Asheville) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1935, c. 122, §2 (Statesville) ; N. C. Priv. Laws
1929, c. 196, §69 (Thomasville); N. C. Priv. Laws 1931, c. 34, §2 (Black Moun-
tain); N. C. Priv. Laws 1929, c. 204 (Rocky Mount, also provides that action
barred if not brought within one year) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1927, c. 26, §2 (Morgan-
ton); N. C. Priv. Laws Ex. Sess. 1924, c. 8, §3 (Landis). The following are
provisions for a notice period of six months, but otherwise similar to the quoted
provision: N. C. Priv. Laws 1923, c. 37, §82A (Greensboro) ; N. C. Priv. Laws
1931, c. 171, §2 (High Point, which also provides that no action shall be brought
within 30 days after notice).
N. C. Priv. Laws 1927, c. 232, §115 (Winston-Salem): "All claims or demands
against the city of Winston-Salem arising in tort shall be presented to the board
of aldermen of said city or to the mayor, in writing, signed by the claimant, his
attorney, or agent, within 90 days after said claim or demand is due or the cause
of action accrues; that no suit or action shall be brought thereon within 10 days
or after the expiration of 12 months from the time said claim is so presented, and
unless the claim is so presented within 90 days after the cause of action accrued,
and unless suit is brought within 12 months thereafter, an action thereon shall be
barred." The following charter requirements are substantially the same as the
Winston-Salem provision: N. C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1939, c. 466, §141Y (Elizabeth
City); N. C. Priv. Laws 1935, c. 105 (Burlington) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1933, c.
18 (Gastonia). Two recent notice provisions may herald a longer period for
filing notice in future legislation on this subject: N. C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1941, c.
476 (Wilmington, 365 days period and applies only to personal injuries); N. C.
Pub. Loc. Laws 1941, c. 253 (Marion, 180 days period with notice to be given by
guardian or next friend if infant or insane).
"0E.g., N. C. Priv. Laws 1913, c. 59, art. XXII, §1 (Raleigh) ; N. C. Priv.
Laws 1901, c. 100, §102 (Aiheville) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1921, c. 142, §48r/ (Dur-
ham); N. C. Priv. Laws 1931, c. 34, §1 (Black Mountain); N. C. Priv. Laws
1923, c. 37, §81 (Greensboro) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1927, c. 26, §1 (Morganton);
N. C. Priv. Laws Ex. Sess. 1924, c. 8, §2 (Landis).
' MACIN OSH, op. cit. supra. note 3, §390; 6 McQuImLIN, op. cit. spra note 2,
§2887; Salim, supra note 1, at 9.
"See Perry v. High Point, 218 N. C. 714, 718, 12 S. E. 2d 275, 278 (1940)
(by implication) ; MACINTOSH, op. cit. supra note 3, §389.
13201 N. C. 258, 159 S. E. 414 (1931).
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complaint for the taking of his water lines by the city to allege that the
city took and used his lines and thus became indebted to the plaintiff
"by virtue of an implied promise or agreement on its part to pay the
plaintiff." The court did not indicate that the change in theory of
recovery made the difference, but held that the notice provision does
not cover a claim for compensation arising out of the physical appro-
priation of property for public use. The rule now seems established
that where property is taken by eminent domain powers, a suit for
compensation is not subject to a notice of injury charter provision.14
Where the action is based on a permanent trespass or nuisance the
notice requirement must be met,1 but the requirement has only limited
operation if the trespass or nuisance is continuing or recurring.1' In
this latter situation, even if notice was given, damages suffered prior to
the beginning of the notice of injury period were once held not recover-
able.'12 But this position was abandoned in favor of the view that the
notice requirement was designed to affect the claimant's right to main-
.tain his action only in reference to the time during which it should be
commenced, so if notice is given only the damages barred by the statute
of limitations are irrecoverable.' 8 Provisions requiring prior present-
ment of -claims are frequently found in charters also having notice of
injury provisions,' 9 thus supporting the conclusion that prior present-
ment of claim requirements apply only to claims based on contract.
Since N. C. GEN STAT. §153-64 (1943) is in practically identical lan-
guage and was so construed 20 prior to the insertion of an express limi-
tation to contract actions, there seems to be no field in which these
charter provisions can be given effect that is not already covered by this
statute.
Notice of injury provisions are universally upheld as valid and con-
stitutional as long as the period for giving it is not so short as to deprive
the party injured of a substantial remedy.2' The North Carolina Su-
"' Charlotte Consolidated Const. Co. v. Charlotte, 208 N. C. 309, 180 S. E. 573
(1935) ; cf. Ivester v. Winston-Salem, 215 N. C. 1, 1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939) (a
nuisance case which amounts to a taking). But cf. Briggs v. Asheville, 198 N. C.
271, 151 S. E. 199 (1930).
"Wallace v. Asheville, 208 N. C. 74, 179 S. E. 18 (1935)'; Peacock v. Greens-
boro, 196 N. C. 412, 146 S. E. 3 (1928) ; Dayton v. Asheville, 185 N. C. 12, 115
S. E. 827 (1923).
" Ivester v. Winston-Salem, 215 N. C. 1, 1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939) ; Lightner v.
Raleigh, 206 N. C. 496, 174 S. E. 272 (1934). This result is reached because such
continuing and recurring injuries give rise to new causes of action all along. No
matter when notice was given, if the nuisance was still causing injury then the.no-
tice would necessarily be within the time allowed for giving notice.1 7Smith v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 178, 126 S. E. 514 (1925).
18 Ivester v. Winston-Salem 215 N. C. 1, 1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939) ; Lightner v.
Raleigh, 206 N. C. 496, 174 S. E. 272 (1934) ; see Chief Justice Hoke dissenting
in Smith v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 178, 126 S. E. 514 (1925).
'o See notes 9 and 10 supra. "0 See note 3 .supra.




preme Court has described a ninety days' notice requirement as reason-
able, with no necessity for showing the plaintiff to have actually known
of it in order for his failure to give notice to defeat his action.
22
Typically, the notice provision requires the notice to be in writing,
stating the date, place, manner of infliction of the injury, the character
of the injury, and the amount of damages claimed.23 Substantial com-
pliance is sufficient where there is nothing to mislead the defendant as
to the basis of the action, and a notice containing date, place, and amount
of damages claimed has been held sufficient where the city had ample
knowledge of the cause of the injury.24 The notice need not be drawn
with the technical nicety of pleading,2 5 and the action need not be
brought during the notice period,26 though North Carolina has not de-
cided whether the complaint will suffice for the notice in this event.
2 7
Sufficiency of the notice is a question of law,2 8 but proof of notice is for
the jury where the evidence is conflicting.
29
The notice must be served on the officials designated in the charter,
usually the governing body. A claim addressed to and served on the
city manager was held not to be presented to the "lawful municipal
authorities," 30 though a charter requiring notice to be served on the
city council was held to have been complied with where the notice was
addressed'to that body but was served on the city manager, the rule
being stated that when the governing body specified is not in session
notice directed to them and delivered to the officer having care and
custody of the records and files is a sufficient compliance.31 Personal
knowledge of the injury by the city officials is not sufficient, nor can
the body designated waive notice or by words or conduct estop the
municipality from taking advantage of failure to give notice.8 2 The
person injured must give the notice or it must be given for him, and
one not named as claimant in the notice cannot sustain the action.83
2 Hartsell v. Asheville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226 (1913), reh. allowed on
other grounds, 166 N. C. 633, 82 S. E. 946 (1914).
23 See note 9 supra.
24 Peacock v. Greensboro, 196 N. C. 412, 146 S. E. 3 (1928) ; Graham v. Char-
lotte, 186 N. C. 649, 120 S. E. 466 (1923).
2 See note 24 supra.20Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N. C. 321, 22 S. E. 2d 900 (1942).
27 For criticism of this practice in other jurisdictions see Sahm, supra note 1, at
4. In states where the notice is held to'be a condition precedent to the right to
bring an action, it has generally been held that the filing of the suitjs not a sub-
stitute for the notice. Note, 101 A.L.R. 726 (1936).
28 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2895.
" Cresler v. Asheville, 134 N. C. 311, 46 S. E. 738 (1904).
' 0Nevins v. Lexington, 212 N. C. 616, 194 S. E. 293 (1937).
" Perry v. High Point, 218 N. C. 714, 12 S. E. 2d 275 (1940).
" Pender v. Salisbury, 160 N. C. 363, 76 S. E. 228 (1912). Notes, 82 A.L.R.
749 (1933) ; 153 A.L.R. 329 (1944) ; 31 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1947).
" Virginia Trust Co. v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 162, 176 S. E. 257 (1934) (damage
to land, notice being given by owner of equity of redemption but suit being brought
by trustee in deed of trust) ; Note, 63 A.L.R. 1080 (1929).
19481
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A failure to give notice within the time fixed by charter does not
defeat the cause of action where the plaintiff is mentally or physically
unable to present it during that period by reason of the injury and did
present it within a reasonable time after he was able to do so, but the
injured person is not excused if he is able to give notice through others
or is not disabled during the entire period.3 4 North Carolina has not
considered whether infancy or insanity would excuse, but the weight of
authority seems to be that it would not unless statute or charter pro-
vided otherwise.3 5
The majority rule is that compliance with notice statutes and charter
provisions is a condition precedent to the institution of an action against
a municipal corporation, and that compliance must not only be proved
but a failure to allege that notice was given as required will render the
complaint demurrable.3 6 Until recently, only one state has consistently
held to the contrary view that failure to give notice is a matter of de-
fense and not a condition precedent.3
7
In a recent case,38 the plaintiff brought an action against a city
for damages suffered as a result of a fall allegedly caused by a hole
"' Foster v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 528, 74 S. E. 412 (1934). Hartsell v. Ashe-
ville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226 (1913), reh. allowed, 166 N. C. 633, 82 S. E.
946 (1914); Terrell v. Washington, 158 N. C. 282, 73 S. E.'888 (1912); see
Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N. C. 321, 22 S. E. 2d 900 (1942).
"5Notes, 109 A.L.R. 975 (1937), 59 A.L.R. 411 (1929), 31 A.L.R. 619 (1924);
6 MCQUILLIx, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2893; Peterson, supra note 1, at 715;
Notes, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 867 (1932), 36 MICH. L. REv. 502 (1938). Terrell v.
Washington, 158 N. C. 282, 73 S. E. 888 (1912) is frequently cited by writers for
the proposition that general legal incapacity will excuse, but no such question was
before the court and though some of the statements in that opinion are broad, they
support the proposition as dicta, if at all.
"E.g., Barnett v. Elizabeth City, 222 N. C. 760, 24 S. E. 2d 264 (1943) ; Web-
ster v. Charlotte, 222 N. C. 321, 22 S. E. 2d 900 (1942) ; Virginia Trust Co. v.
Asheville, 207 N. C. 162, 175 S. E. 257 (1934) ; Foster v. Charlotte, 206 N. C.
528, 174 S. E. 412 (1934); Hartsell v. Asheville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226
(1913), reh. allowed on other grounds, 166 N. C. 633, 82 S. E. 946 (1914) ; Pender
v. Salisbury, 160 N. C. 363, 76 S. E. 228 (1912) ; Cresler v. Asheville, 134 N. C.
311, 46 S. E. 738 (1904); Maise v. Gadsden, 232 Ala. 82, 166 So. 795 (1936);
Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577, 182 Atl. 225 (1935) ; Russell v. Wilming-
ton, 35 Del. 193, 162 At. 71 (1932) ; Williams v. Jacksonville, 118 Fla. 671, 160
So. 15 (1935), Cuvelier v. Dumont, 221 Iowa 667, 266 N. W. 517 (1936) ; Des-
chant v. Hays, 112 Kan. 729, 212 Pac. 682 (1923) ; Galloway v. Winchester, 299
Ky. 87, 184 S. W. 2d 890 (1944) ; Huntington v. Calais, 105 Me. 144, 73 Atl. 829
(1909); O'Connell v. Cambridge, 258 Mass. 203, 154 N. E. 760 (1927); Gable
v. Detroit, 226 Mich. 261, 197 N. W. 169 (1924) ; Johnson v. Chisholm, 222 Minn.
179, 24 N. W. 2d 232 (1946) ; Harms v. Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N. W. 2d 287
(1942); Sweeney v. New York, 225 N. Y. 271, 122 N. E. 243 (1919), reversing
173 App. Div. 984, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1145 (2d Dep't 1916) (memorandum decision);
Lane v. Cray, 50 R. I. 486, 149 Atl. 593 (1930) ; Knoxville v. Felding, 153 Tenn.
586, 285 S. W. 47 (1926); Waco v. Watkins, 292 S. W. 583 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) ; Duschaine v. Everett, 5 Wash. 2d 181, 105 P. 2d 18 (1940) ; Hay v. Bara-
boo, 127 Wis. 1, 105 N. W. 654 (1905).
"' Cole v. St. Joseph, 50 S. W. 2d 623 (Mo. 1932) ; Brown v. Kirksville, 294
S. W. 436 (Mo. App. 1928) ; Branchetti v. Luce, 222 Mo. App. 282, 2 S. W. 2d 129
(1928) ; Beane v. St. Joseph, 211 Mo. App. 200, 240 S. W. 840 (1922) ; Adelman
v. Altman, 209 Mo. App. 583, 240 S. W. 272 (1922)." South Norfolk v. Dail, 47 S. E. 2d 405 (Va. 1948).
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in the sidewalk of one of the streets of the city. Plaintiff recovered
below, and on appeal the defendant city contended for the first time
that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try "the case inasmuch as the
plaintiff had failed to allege that notice of injury was given as required
by statute and charter. Recognizing that the law of Virginia had been
that a failure to allege notice was fatal to an action, the Virginia Court
overruled their previous decisions and held that such a notice require-
ment is not a condition precedent to the right to institute an action and,
therefore, the defendant had raised the question too late. In the words
of he court, "after mature consideration we have reached the conclusion
that this holding is harsh and unreasonable, and should be modified.
* . . The failure to make the allegation of notice should be taken ad-
vantage of by the city as a matter of defense to the action." It follows
that failure to plead the defense resulted in waiver of it, since the matter
was not put in issue. The present North Carolina rule is thus sharply
opposed to the law as announced by the Virginia Court.
Several reasons have been advanced to justify the notice of injury
requirement: (1) to prevent fraud by giving municipal authorities an
early opportunity to investigate such claims while the evidence is fresh,3 9
(2) to enable" the city to determine whether or not it should admit
liability and undertake to settle the claim without suit4o and, (3) to en-
able authorities to allow for such claims when preparing fiscal estimates
for the future.41 These are very fine objectives as far as a defendant
city is concerned, but it should be readily apparent that any defendant
operating through agents and employees over a considerable area would
similarly applaud such a beneficent gesture in its behalf. To really
justify prior notice, it is necessary to find something in a municipality's
situation as to tort liability that differentiates it from the status of cor-
porate defendants generally.
Considering prior notice as one manifestation of a municipal tort
immunity that has its roots in the immunity enjoyed by'the state in such
matters, it is significant that "the king can do no wrong" concept is
the subject of sharp attack.42 The enactment of the Federal Tort
=" Foster v. Charlotte, 206 U. C. 528, 174 S. E. 412 (1934) ; Hartsell v. Ashe-
ville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226 (1913) ; Pender v. Salisbury, 160 N. C. 363, 76
S. E. 228 (1912).
"' Perry v. High Point, 218 N. C. 714, 12 S. E. 2d 275 (1940) ; Virginia Trust
Co. v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 162, 176 S. E. 257 (1934) ; Peacock v. Greensboro, 196
N. C. 412, 146 S. E. 3 (1928)." Note, 24 VA. L. Rxv. 86 (1937).
426 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §§2792, 2793, 2794. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS §108 (1941) (see list of materials on this point in footnote 30) ; Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925); Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927); Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 CoL. L. REv. 577 (1928); Borchard,
Theories of Governmental Responsibility it; Tort, 28 Col. L. REv. 734 (1928);
Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20
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Claims Act (which has no mandatory notice provision) is some of the
fruit of this spirited planting.43 As far as proprietary functions are
concerned, it has been generally understood for some time that a mu-
nicipal corporation is subject to the liabilities of the private law,4 4 but
as to governmental functions the courts are now embarrassed and at
times humiliated by doctrines of immunity that cannot be defended. 45
Confusion as to the distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions resulting in about as many functions being in the shadowland
between, as definitely in one or the other, is hastening the eventual
demise of municipal tort immunity.
Granting the difficulty of justifying the notice requirement on the
basis of the decaying concept of general municipal tort immunity, can
it be justified otherwise? Some who have attacked the basic principle
with vigor foresee a more pressing need for notice with the coming of
full municipal responsibility.48 The argument advanced, however, is
the old chant of fraud and imposition which was a major prop of the
doctrine of municipal immunity and one of the first to be attacked.
There is no justification that will bear close scrutiny, mainly because
there is nothing to distinguish municipal corporations from corporate
bodies generally except their public character, and it is this public char-
acter which has been exploded insofar as municipal liability for tort is
concerned.
Having a notice requirement, however, is it necessary to convert it
into "a trap and pitfall for the ignorant and unskillful" ?4 On appeal,
Virginia would have allowed the failure to plead notice to have been
interposed for the first time by the defendant city before the principal
case on grounds that it was a jurisdictional essential, and North Caro-
lina would reach the same logical result, for failure to allege notice
A. B. A. J. 747 (1934) (valuable list of materials on p. 748, n. 1) ; Fuller and
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAXv. L. REV. 437 (1941);
Green, Municipal Liability for Tort, 38 ILL. L. PRav. 355 (1944) ; Hobbs, The Tort
Liability of Municipalities, 27 VA. L. REv. 126 (1940); Peterson, Governmental
Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L. Ray. 854, 874-879 (1942);
Symposium on Municipal Tort Liability, 5 LEGAL NOTES ON Loc. Gov. 351 (1940);
Warp, Can the "King" Do No Wrong, 31 NAT. MUNIC. RaV. 311 (1942); Warp,
The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28 VA. L. REv. 360
(1942) ; Notes, 14 N. C. L. REV. 388 (1936), 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 509 (1947),
16 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 256 (1942), 5 U. OF DEr. L. J. 83 (1942), 24 VA. L. REv.
86 (1937) ; Comments, 42 YALE L. J. 241 (1932).
" 60 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. §§921 et seq. (1946). See Baer, Siting
Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N. C. L. Ryv. 119 (1948).
"6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§2771, 2792.
"Green, supra note 42, at 381.
"Borchard, State and Municipal Liability, 20 A. B. A. J. 747, 793 (1934)
(Sec. 5 of Borchard's proposed statute is a 30-day notice requirement); Sahm,
Tort Notice of Claim to Municipalities, 46 Dicx L. REv. 1 (1941) ; Symposium, 5
LEGAL NoTEs ON Loc. Gov. 351, 382 (1940).
" WHITE, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §64 (1920).
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in this state is a failure to state a cause of action.48 The legislative
handicap of having to give notice is enough to inflict upon a plaintiff,
but to judicially handicap by placing the burden of pleading notice on
him is to slap his cheek the second time. It would seem that the mu-
nicipality which has been given such a fine legal weapon should be
required to utilize it, pleading failure to give notice within the period
specified as with other statutes of limitation. This would be in accord
with modern pleading tendencies to remove pitfalls in the way of honest
claimants.
If notice requirements are to be retained, there is need for a notice
statute of general application, for all municipalities should be accorded
the protection afforded by prior notice if it is a justified municipal safe-
guard. It would be to the interest of the bench, bar, and the public
generally to be rid of the galaxy of varying requirements now found in
our charters in favor of a requirement which would not make the charter
of the particular city where the injury occurs such an important con-
sideration. Such a step would remove much of the difficulty in con-
struction and serve to inform the public generally of the uniform hurdle
that all must face in suing a municipality in North Carolina. The fol-
lowing statute is proposed:
It shall be a good defense to an action brought against a
city or town for injury to person or property sustained by rea-
son of the negligence of the city or town, that a written state-
ment of the time and place where the injury was received, the
nature of the injury, and the amount of damages claimed was
not filed with the city or town attorney or the mayor within
90 days after the injury occurred: Provided, where the person
injured is an infant or non compos mentis such statement may
be filed within 180 days: Provided, further, that where the
action is for wrongful death the statement may be filed within
180 days of the date of death. All charter provisions for no-
tice of injury or presentation of tort claims to the city or




The evidence of the plaintiff tended to show that he was driving
40 to 45 miles per hour along a highway on a clear night, and that he
had just rounded a long curve and traveled over the crest of a small
hill when his automobile collided with an unlighted truck which was
"' MAcNTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §389 (1929).
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* parked on the other side of the hill. The plaintiff did not see the truck
in time to stop or turn to the left before striking it. There was no
traffic approaching from the opposite direction. Held: Nonsuit on the
grounds of contributory negligence was proper since the plaintiff's evi-
dence disclosed that he "outran his headlights" and that he was inatten-
tive to the duty required of him for his own safety when he rounded
the curve and topped the hill at a high rate of speed.'
The laws of the road have developed on the theory that every driver
owes every other driver a duty to observe the statutes regulating travel
on the highways. These statutes enter into and become a part of the
measure of prudent conduct among drivers, and one who uses the high-
ways is permitted by the law to put some reliance on the statutes being
complied with by others. If the law were otherwise, one could not
venture upon the highways without protecting himself from every con-
ceivable danger and every driver would become an insurer of his own
safety.2
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has had an opportunity to
apply this theory many times in situations similar to that of the subject
case. In fact, two other very recent decisions have involved rear-end
collisions of this sort.8
When a car traveling upon the highway collides with an unlighted
truck parked upon the hard surface, the negligence of the truck driver
is usually easy of proof, especially in a state which requires by statute
that flares or lights be set out a specified distance down the highway
to warn approaching cars.4 The question then becomes one of whether
the driver of the moving car has exercised due care on his own part.
In considering this question it is accepted that the car driver is per-
mitted to rely to some extent upon a compliance by the truck driver
with this requirement of giving warning, but on the other hand it has
become a well established genei:al rule of law in the courts of this coun-
try that it is negligence for one to drive a motor vehicle at such a rate
of speed that it cannot be stopped in time to avoid an obstruction dis-
cernible within the range of his vision ahead.5
The application of this rule to situations similar to that of the sub-
ject case has developed along two general lines. In some states the
rule has been made statutory, and applied strictly to bar a recovery by
'Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251 (1948).
2 Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945).
3 Riggs v. Gulf Oil Corp., 228 N. C. 774, 47 S. E. 2d 254 (1948) ; McKinnon
v. Howard Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132, 44 S. E. 2d 735. (1948).
' See N. C. GEx. STAT. §20-161 (1943).
'Fisher v. O'Brien, 99 Kan. 621, 162 Pac. 317 (1917) ; Spencer v. Taylor, 219
Mich. 110, 188 N. W. 461 (1922); Serfas v. Lehigh R. R., 270 Pa. 306, 113 Atl. 370
(1921); West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S. W. 301 (1914) ;
Nikoleropoulous v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 Pac. 304 (1923); HUDDY, ATrrofo-
BIES §396 (8th ed. 1927).
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anyone driving a motor vehicle after dark who collides with an un-
lighted vehicle ahead. 6 Other courts, in states where there is no such
statute, have felt that the rule should not be applied as an arbitrary
measure of the driver's fault, and have allowed a much greater scope
of inquiry. These jurisdictions feel that the court should not set up
a rule that the question of negligence on a given state of facts is almost
entirely one of law. 7 The rule is therefore given to the jury, to be
applied by them in the light of conditions surrounding the accident.
Speed, visibility, topography of the road, color of the truck, and other
factors may then be considered, and the standard of the reasonable
and prudent man retains its fluidity. This seems to be the preferable
application, since the issue of contributory negligence is ordinarily for
the jury,8 and the court should not take the case away from the jury
where there is any evidence opposing contributory negligence in the
plaintiff's proof. 9 At least one jurisdiction has taken a different ap-
proach to the same situation and has found the truck driver to be guilty
of a gross disregard of the rights of others when he leaves his truck
stopped and unlighted on the highway, thus depriving him of his right
to rely upon the contributory negligence of the.plaintiff to defeat re-
covery.' 0
The North Carolina Supreme Court first adopted the rule that it
was negligence to outrun one's headlights in 1927 in Weston v. Southern
Ry.,"1 which involved a collision between an automobile moving along
the highway and an unlighted freight train standing upon a grade cross-
ing. The plaintiff driver of the car was held to be contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law. Two years later the court was called upon to
decide whether it could be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent when the evidence showed that he had run into
the back of an unlighted truck parked on the concrete portion of the
highway.1 2 The court noted its decision in the Weston case, but in-
stead of applying the rule against "outrunning the headlights" fell back
upon the general standard of the reasonable and prudent man, and find-
ing that there were "opposing inferences permissible from the plaintiff's"
proof," held that the issue of contributory negligence was properly
I See e.g., Lindquist v. Thierman, 216 Iowa 170, 248 N. W. 504 (1933) ; Curtis
v. Hubbel, 42 Ohio App. 520, 182 N. E. 589 (1932).
7 Rozycki v. Yantic Grain and Products Co., 99 Conn. 711, 122 Atl. 717 (1923);
Hanno v. Motor Freight Lines, 17 La. App. 62, 134 So. 317 (1931); Chaffee v.
Duclos, 105 Vt. 384, 166 Atl. 2 (1933).
8 Lincoln v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 207 N. C. 787, 178 S. E. 189 (1935).
o Battle v. Cleve, 179 N. C. 112, 101 S. E. 555 (1919).
2
0 Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 178 S. W. 2d 756 (1944).
21194 N. C. 210, 139 S. E. 237 (1927).
1- Williams v. Frederickson Motor Express Lines, 198 N. C. 193, 151 S. E.
197 (1929) (plaintiff's evidence was that he did not see the unlighted truck until
he was within five or ten feet because his lights were adjusted down).
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submitted to the jury. For some years thereafter the court used the
same approach in similar rear-end collision cases. 13
In 1940 the court indicated a change of attitude. In Clarke v.
Martin14 the usual result of the previous cases was followed in sustain-
ing the denial of the motion for nonsuit of the plaintiff's case. But the
court found error in the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury to
find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence if they found from the
evidence that the plaintiff was traveling at such speed that he could
not stop within a "much greater" distance than he could see. The
Weston case was quoted at length and the principle enunciated there
was held to be applicable to the case at bar. That same year in Beck v.
Hooks' 5 a denial of a motion for non suit in the trial court was reversed
on the authority of the Weston case. The court split four to three on
the decision, and justice Clarkson, writing the dissent, vigorously pro-
tested against what he interpreted to be a departure from "the rule of
reasonable prudence" and a substitution for it of a "mathematical form."
In his opinion, the rule required an "instant recognition of danger when,
through the highest degree of diligence and altertness, it [the truck]
might have been seen."' 81
Whether Justice Clarkson's fears are to be realized remains to be
seen. In some of the rear-end collision cases decided since the Beck
case, the court still speaks in terms of each case being decided on its
own facts.17 That would allow the court to consider conditions sur-
rounding the accident in determining whether the driver has exercised
prudent care, rather than nonsuiting the plaintiff as a matter of course
because he had hit an unlighted truck from the rear. At least one case
"Lambert v. Caronna, 206 N. C. 616, 175 S. E 303 (1934) (plaintiff traveling
at 30 to 35 mph tipped his lights down just before he hit rear of car parked on
highway); Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C. 188, 198 S. E. 637 (1938) (plaintiff traveling
25 miles per hour on foggy night with visibility of 30 yards) ; Clarke v. Martin,
215 N. C. 405, 2 S. E. 2d 10 (1939) (motion for non-suit properly denied though
plaintiff's evidence showed he was traveling at a speed of about 25 mph and 4isi-
bility was restricted by fog and ice to 10 or 15 feet) ; Page v. McLamb, 215 N. C.
789, 3 S. E. 2d 275 (1939) ("There was allegation and evidence tending to prove
that the defendant's truck was parked at least partially on the hard surface of the
road in the nighttime without lights either in front or rear, and that the driver of
the plaintiff's tractor did not observe the truck in time to avoid colliding with it.
This was sufficient to deny the defendant's motion for nonsuit").
"217 N. C. 440, 8 S. E. 2d 230 (1940).
"218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608 (1940) (plaintiff traveling 40 mph on straight
road, was blinded by passing car, took foot off accelerator and was traveling 15
or 20 mph when he hit the truck).
18Id. at 115.
"'Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251 (1948) ("No factual formula
can be laid down which will determine in every instance the person legally re-
sponsible for a rear end collision on a highway at night between a standing vehicle
and one that is moving"); Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36
S. E. 2d 11 (1945) ("A much broader view of the occurrence and its component
and related factors is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff failed to exer-
cise ordinary prudence under the circumstances and conditions which prevailed at
the time of the collision.").
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indicates that the standard of the reasonable and prudent man definitely
has not been abandoned for a "mathematical form."18  Still it must be
noted that most of the rear-end collision cases decided since the Beck
case have ended in nonsuit on the grounds of contributory negligence,
and each time the court has grounded its decision in whole or in part
upon the fact that the plaintiff had been outrunning his headlights.' 9 The
same result might have been reached in these latter cases if the standard
of prudent care alone had been applied. Be that as it may, the fact re-
mains that so long as decisions are made in terms of a standard that
may be arbitrarily applied, there is danger that the standard itself will
in time become a mechanical rule and embodied in our law as such to
the exclusion of a rule of reason under pressure of these decisions.
Recent cases give some indication of the weight to be given con-
ditions existing at the time of the collision as affecting the plaintiff's
chances of getting to the jury. It would seem that a driver is not re-
quired to slow or attempt to stop when he is momentarily blinded by
a passing car, especially when the blinding occurs just before the acci-
dent takes place.20 On the other hand, to travel for as much as two
or three seconds, or for as far as 100 feet while blinded is contributory
negligence as a matter of law.21 The color of the truck is a factor and
if it is greyish, or mud-splattered, or film-covered so as to blend into
the background, it is a point in the plaintiff's favor, for he is less likely
to be put on notice of its presence.22 Sometimes the height of the truck
body above the ground has been considered, where the car's lights were
tipped downward and did not readily disclose the body of the truck.
But this favors the plaintiff only if he was forced to slant his lights be-
cause he passed a car just before the accident. To drive with the lights
tipped downward when there is no passing traffic is negligence. 28 The
presence of smoke or fog on the highway seems to be treated as putting
the driver on notice of danger.24
The subject case points up the effect which the court will give to
the presence of curves and hills in the road just before the place of the
accident. The plaintiff's evidence showed that he was traveling under
otherwise perfect conditions when he went around a curve and over a
18 Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., supra note 17.
19 Sibbitt v. R. & W. Transit Co., 220 N. C. 702, 18 S. E. 2d 703 (1941) ; Pike
v. Seymour, 222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942) ; Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N. C.
402, 30 S. E. 2d 312 (1944) ; McKinnon v. Howard Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132,
44 S. E. 2d 735 (1948) (by implication); Riggs v. Gulf Oil Co., 228 N. C. 774,
47 S. E. 2d 254 (1948) ; Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251 (1948).
" Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945).
2 McKinnon v. Howard Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132, 44 S. E. 2d 735 (1948).
2 Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945).
Pike v. Seymour, 222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942).
2 Riggs v. Gulf Oil Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945); Sibbitt v.
R. & W. Transit Co., 220 N. C. 702, 18 S. E. 2d 703 (1941).
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small hill, and collided with an unlighted truck just below the crest of
the hill. In its decision, the court pointed out that, by statute, curves
and hills are conditions a motorist is required to consider in regulating
his speed "as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, ve-
hicle, or other conveyance."2 5  That requirement, considered in con-
junction with the rule of the Weston case was held to be one of the
two circumstances which prevented the plaintiff from getting to the
jury. The other was evidence of the inattentiveness of the driver. The
court did not indicate whether the first circumstance alone would have
been sufficient to support its decision. If so, and if the case is later
interpreted to mean that it is negligence as a matter of law to drive
around a curve and over the crest of a hill on a clear night at a speed
of 40 to 45 miles per hour, then it would seem that the court has taken
a step toward the adoption of a mathematical formula for the solving
of these rear-end collision cases.
LEMUEL H. GIBBONS.
Trusts-Duration-Rule against Perpetuities
A died in 1923 leaving property by will in trust for his son B, with
a power of appointment in B by will, the property to go to B's children
if he died intestate. B, a widower, died, in 1945, leaving one-half the
property to his two infant children upon their reaching age 25 and the
other half in trust for them for life with power to appoint by will to
a class or a charity. Upon the trustee's request for instructions, held,
the children take the property free of the trust and the power; the
equitable life estates would probably last longer than 21 years after the
death of B and thus violate the Rule against Perpetuities. 1
There is a difference of opinion as to the point in time when the
period of the rule against remoteness of vesting begins to run, where
there is a general power of testamentary disposition. Some authorities
maintain that the period starts when the power is exercised, because
the donee could appoint to his estate, which is practically like appointing
to himself.2 Others claim that it is just like any other special power
because of the inability to appoint to oneself and that it should start
when the power was created, either by deed'or will.3 The weight of
5 Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 781, 47 S. E. 2d 251, 252 (1948).
'American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N. C. 458, 46 S. E. 2d 104 (1948).
2 Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927); Rous v. Jackson,
29 Ch. D. 521 (1885); KALEs, ESTATES, FuruRE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDI-
TIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS §695 (2d ed. 1920).
'De Charette v. De Charette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S. W. 2d 1018 (1936) ; Hawkins
v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 Atl. 212 (1928); Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120
N. E. 167 (1918) ; In re Lewis' Estate, 349 Pa. 571, 37 A. 2d 482 (1944) ; In re
Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 Atl. 396 (1936); In re Powell's Trusts, 39
L. J. Ch. 188 (1869); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §526 (4th ed.
1942) ; RooD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLs 779 (2d ed. 1926) ; 2 SIMaES,
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authority, aided or led by Professor Gray,4 holds that the time is meas-
ured from the creation of the power.5 In the principal case, the court,
following earlier North Carolina cases, adhered to the majority rule.6
And it was conceded that the rule against remoteness of vesting ren-
dered void the power to vest the fee beyond the lives of the children.
Most courts7 and text writers s are in accord with the view that the
Rule against Perpetuities, as such, does not render a trust invalid merely
because it may extend beyond the time limit if the interests thereunder
vest within the specified time. However, a new rule of American
origin,9 which is adhered to in the majority of states which have con-
sidered it, that an indestructible private trust may not continue for a
period longer than that of the Rule against Perpetuities, renders the
trust void. This rule, unknown in England because indestructible
trusts are not there favored,' 0 has been introduced in America to in-
crease alienability and to prevent circumvention of the Rule against
Perpetuities by the use of the trust device,"1 though not without oppo-
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §538 (1936); 3 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY §713 (3d ed. 1939) ; 3 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY §340 (1947); see Notes, 33 GEO. L. J. 234 (1945), 1 A. L. R. 374
(1919).
'GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §526.
See note 3 supra. It is otherwise where the power is exercisable by deed or
will, the theory being that the donee is practically the owner since he can appoint
to himself. Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889).
'Hardee v. Rivers, 228 N. C. 66, 44 S. E. 2d 476 (1947) ; Roane v. Robinson,
189 N. C. 628, 127 S. E. 626 (1925) ; White v. White, 189 N. C. 236, 126 S. E.
612 (1925) ; Chewning v. Mason, 158 N. C. 578, 74 S. E. 357 (1912) ; FARWELL, A
CONCISE TREATISE ON PowERs 325 (3d ed. 1916).
Wilbur v. Portland Trust Co., 121 Conn. 535, 186 AtI. 499 (1936) (where
cestui que trust was also entitled to legal estate upon termination of the trust) ;
Loomer v. Loomer, 76 Conn. 522, 57 Atl. 167 (1904) ; Story v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 155 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S. W. 2d 720 (1938); Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514,
120 N. E. 167 (1918) (again appointment in trust for life to child unborn at death
of donor upheld) ; Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896) ; Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Robb, 118 N. J. Eq. 529, 180 Atl. 410 (1935) ; In re Wanamaker's
Estate, 335 Pa. 241, 6 A. 2d 852 (1939); In re Boyd's Estate, 199 Pa. 487, 49
Atl. 297 (1901) (here A left property in trust to minor daughter for life with
power of appointment by will, which she validly exercised by setting up a trust
for her son's life, though her attempt to give him a power of appointment was
invalid); Tramell v. Tramell, 162 Tenn. 1, 32 S. W. 2d 1025 (1930) ; see In re
Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354, 367, 20 Atl. 521, 523 (1890). Contra: Colonial
Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 AtI. 555 (1926).
'GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, §232; 1 PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §383 n. 2(a) (6th ed. 1911); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§62(k) (1935); 1 Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §62.10 (1939); 2 TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §408 (3d ed. 1939). Contra: 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra
note 3, §§500, 553.
11 BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §218 (1935) ; Scott, Control
of Property by the Dead 11, 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 632 (1917).
"0 Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (1841).
"it re Howard's Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 312 (1945) ; In- re Stephen's Estate,
129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 AtI. 653 (1937); REmSEN, THE PREPARATION OF WIL S
AND TRUSTS §10 (2d ed. 1930) ; 1 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §62.10 (1939) (it
is against public policy to permit continuance of such a trust though interests are
all vested).
1948]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sition.12 The principal case is the first direct decision in North Caro-
lina that this rule against excess duration of an indestructible private
trust operates to make a vested trust estate void. Heretofore, North
Carolina has declared that the Rule against Perpetuities as applied in this
state is the rule against remoteness of vesting,13 and that it is concerned
only with the vesting of estates, not with their enjoyment or possession.
14
The North Carolina court has frequently stated that the Rule against
Perpetuities does not apply to charitable trusts, and this is repeated in
the principal case. What is meant, however, is that a charitable trust
will not fail for excessive duration,15 because of the countervailing
public gain. For the rule against remoteness of vesting does apply to
charitable trusts, except where the property vests in one charity after
another charity.18 Indeed, in the principal case, the power of appoint-
ment that was concededly stricken by the rule against remoteness was
a power to leave the property to charity in the alternative.
ROBERT L. HINES.
Wrongful Death-Amendment of the Pleadings after the
Limitation Period Has Run
In a recent case' the plaintiff sued to recover for the wrongful death
of her husband, alleging that as he was driving along the highway in a
careful manner the defendant "negligently and carelessly" ran into him
from the rear and killed him. The defendant entered a demurrer ore
tenus at the trial, which was sustained on the ground that the complaint
did not state any fact constituting negligence. The plaintiff was granted
permission to amend. She then enumerated items of negligence, and
was awarded a judgment of $6550 on a jury verdict of negligence. On
appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court stated the rule that an amend-
ment which introduces a new cause of action will not relate back to the
" Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896); REsTATEDENT,
PROPERTY §378 (1944) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §62(k) (1935).1 Vinson v. Gardner, 185 N. C. 193, 116 S. E. 412 (1923); Springs v. Hopkins,
171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916) ; O'Neal v. Borders, 170 N. C. 483, 87 S. E.
340 (1915).
14 Springs v. Hopkins, 171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916); accord, Story v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 155 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Hawkins v.
Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 Atl. 212 (1928) (where the four appointees, given life
estates in trust, were unborn at creation of power of appointment and estates were
held valid) ; Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253 (1867). GRaY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§121.5; 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 8, §383.
" Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro, 218 N. C. 686, 12 S. E. 2d 253 (1940) ; State
ex. rel. Wardens v. Gerard, 37 N. C. 210 (1842) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21 (1943) ;
2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, §352; 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra mote 8, §384; 3 Scorr,
op. cit. supra note 11, §365.
" Williams v. Williams, 215 N. C. 739, 3 S. E. 2d 334 (1939) ; 2 BoGER, op.
cit. supra note 9, §§ 342-349; GRaY, op. cit. supra note 3, §594; 3 WALSH, Op. cit.
supra note 3, §341; see Reynolds Foundation v. Trustees of Wake Forest College,
227 N. C. 500, 513, 42 S. E. 2d 910, 918 (1947).'Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N. C. 574, 46 S. E. 2d 700 (1948).
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original complaint, and held that as the plaintiff's amended complaint
first stated a cause of action more than one year after her intestate's
death, thereby failing to meet the requirements of the Wrongful Death
Act,2 the judgment must be reversed. In a dissenting opinion Mr.
Justice Seawell took the position that the plaintiff had only defectively
stated a good cause of action and that the amendment should relate
back to the original complaint.
A recent Note in this LAW RI VEW3 discussed the question of
amendments which change the cause of action, and after demonstrating
the difficulties involved in determining the status an amendment will
be given, entered a plea for the adoption of the provision of the Federal
Rules4 for the relation back of amendments. Clearly under this rule
the instant case would have had a different result, for the negligence
alleged in general terms and that set forth in detail both arose out of
the same occurrence. 5 The difficulty is not in the rule that an amend-
ment stating a new or different cause of action will not relate back,
but rather in determining when to apply it.6 The North Carolind Su-
preme Court has declared the purpose of the one year limitation in the
Wrongful Death Act to be the giving of notice to the defendant so that
he can prepare himself, and this is done by the institution of the action.
7
To construe the perfecting of a bad complaint as the statement of a
new cause of action is to unduly favor the wrongdoer, who has been
given notice of the claim against him.
The authorities advocate liberal application of the rule allowing the
amendment to relate back. Judge Charles E. Clark, in speaking of
allowing amendments to relate back in wrongful death actions, says:
"But now in all but a few jurisdictions the amendment is allowed if it
refers to the same general aggregate of operative facts upon which the
complaint was based."8  Professor McIntosh says the North Carolina
rule allows relation back when "the amendment is intended to perfect
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943) (".. . an action . . .to be brought within
one year after such death.").
* Note, Amendments Changing the Cause of Action-Limitations of Actions,
25 N. C. L. REv. 76 (1946).
" FED. R. Clv. P., 15 (c) ("Relation back of Amendments. Whenever the claim
or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.").
16 Am. JuR.., Death §289 ("... a petition alleging negligence in general terms
may be amended so as to set forth the facts, although the period of limitation for
the bringing of the action has expired when the amendment is made.").
TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr 187 (2d ed. 1913).
"See Trull v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 151 N. C. 545, 548, 66 S. E. 586, 587
(1909). Note, 4 Mo. L. Rav. 49 (1933) (a lea for the adoption of a notice-giving
test rather than the "cause of action" test for relation back of amendments because
of the present conflicting authorities).
8 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 729 (2d ed. 1947). Id. at 731 ("And unless there
has been so great a change in the material operative facts that an entirely different
fact situation is presented, the amendment should be allowed."). See also id. §118.
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the cause of action or defense which was imperfectly stated, or is ger-
mane to the original cause, deals with the same transaction, and does
not state a new cause of action." 9
In the principal case the court recognizes the unfortunate situation
in which the plaintiff finds himself. The careful defense counsel can
delay his test of the sufficiency of the pleadings at law until the trial,
and if the limitation period has intervened, it will thus be too late for
the plaintiff to avail himself of an amendment.' 0 He may elect to stand
on his complaint at the risk of being dismissed if the demurrer is sus-
tained." If he amends his complaint rather than taking an appeal on
the demurrer, he risks having the first demurrer called the law of the
case, as not having stated a cause of action, and subsequent amend-
ments would be barred as stating a new cause of action.12 But the
court feels bound by its previous decisions, and in similiar cases it is
unlikely that it will allow amendments to relate back where a complaint
first fails to state a cause of action.
Yet, North Carolina has respectable authority for an opposite re-
sult.13 In Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R. the court allowed an amend-
ment to show the Virginia Death Statute after it had been denied by
the trial court as stating a new cause of action. Chief Justice Clark
said, "The rounding out of the complaint to cure a defective complaint
even in material matters is not changing a cause of action, nor adding
a new cause, but merely making a good cause out of that which was a
defective statement of the cause of action. . . . If the cause of action
were not defectively stated, there would be no need for amendment."' 4
The application and policy of North Carolina's "Saving Statute"'1
MCINTOSH, N. C. PRACMICE AND PROCEDURE §492 (1929). See also Notes,
30 Mice. L. REv. 795 (1932), 82 U. oF PA. L. REV. 657 (1934), 4 MERCER Bz-s-
LEY L. REv. 204 (1934), 171 A.L.R. 1087 (1947)."Note, The Demurrer Ore Tenus, [1947] Wis. L. REv. 426.
"Ballinger v. Thomas 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
22 George v. Atlanta & C.A.L.R.R, 210 N. C. 58, 185 S. E. 431 (1936) (same
case earlier dismissed when defendant's demurrer sustained, 207 N. C. 457, 177
S. E. 324 (1934). The court said the first demurrer became the law of the case,
not to be questioned. Capps v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533
(1922) (first action brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act; amend-
ment to bring it under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act denied. But see Chief
Justice Clark dissenting at 195, 111 S. E. at 540: "An action for a serious wrong
in a court of justice ought not to be denied upon metaphysical distinctions, or in-
genious discussions based upon a matching of wits between counsel.").
" Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E. 642 (1904) ; Renn v.
Seaboard A. L. R. R., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915), aff'd, 241 U. S. 290
(1916) ; Lefler Bros. v. Lane, 170 N. C. 181, 86 S. E. 1022 (1915).
14 136 N. C. 89, 92, 48 S. E. 642, 644 (1904). Walker concurring, id, at 96,
48 S. E. at 645 ("The right of amendment is denied only when the court can see
that it is impossible for the cause of action to be perfected, or ... when it appears
affirmatively that there is not, and cannot be, a cause of action.").
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-25 (1943) ("If an action is commenced within the time
prescribed therefore, and the plaintiff is nonsuited, or a judgment therein reversed
on appeal, or is arrested, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within
one year. .. ").
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are in conflict with the rule of the principal case. The effect of this
statute is to extend the limitation period an extra year for any action
which is nonsuited, reversed, or arrested,16 and it has been applied to
conditions annexed to the cause of action as well as to ordinary Statutes
of Limitation.' 7 Under this section the court has allowed a new action
after a demurrer ore tenus had been sustained in the first action for
failure to state facts constituting a cause of action.'
8
In Blades v. Southern R. R.19 the court extended this tatute beyond
any rigid requirement of form in holding that a new action for wrong-
ful death brought eighteen months after plaintiff's intestate died could
relate back to a prior cross-complaint which had been dismissed as not
germane to the action in which it was filed.
In Woodcock v. Bostic2O the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and the "Saving Statute" was applied to allow a "new action"
after the Statute of Limitations had run. Since the section would have
been no protection against the Statute of Limitation if a new cause of
action had been alleged, the court expressly held that bringing a new
action after a failure to state a cause of action was not the statement of
a new cause of action. In 1828 Justice Ruffin said of the section, "The
plaintiff, therefore, shall be heard, until he can get a trial on the merits,
provided he has been diligent enough in the first instance to sue before
time barred him."2' 1
The principal case will serve to curtail seriously the valuable right
to amend pleadings, and will allow such amendments to relate back to
the original pleading only where it would have been good against a
demurrer in the first place. The plaintiff is thus required to stand or
fall on his first pleading if the Statute of Limitations has run, and such
was not the contemplation of our liberal amendment statute.22 A remedy
could be found either in the adoption of the Federal Rule,23 or in the
application of the "notice test"2 4 to our rule of relation back.
EDWARD B. HIpp.
1 Meekins v. Norfolk & S. R. R., 131 N. C. 1, 42 S. E. 333 (1902).
1TIbid.
11Webb v. Hicks, 125 N. C. 201, 34 S. E. 395 (1899).9 218 N. C. 702, 12 S. E. 2d 553 (1940).
20 128 N. C. 243, 38 S. E. 881 (1901) (the "new action" was in fact an amend-
ment to the first complaint, and was allowed to spare the delay and expense of a
new action).
4 Morrison v. Connelly, 13 N. C. 233, 239 (1828). See Note, 40 Co. L. REv.
1440 (1940) criticizing a West Virginia case which refused to apply the Saving
Statute to a wrongful death action because the limitation was a condition prece-
dent. The principal case also accents the substantive nature of the limitation, but
expressly indicates that the same rule on relation back would apply to ordinary
Statutes of Limitation.
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-163 (1943). "The judge may . . . amend any plead-
ing ... by inserting other allegations material to the case."
See note 4 supra.
,See note 7 supra.
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